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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this thesis was to explore the modern threats to the maritime 
homeland security environment and the effectiveness of Area Maritime Security 
Committees (AMSCs) in preventing and responding to transportation security incidents. 
AMSCs are deliberately designed to encompass senior representatives of numerous 
stakeholders in the maritime homeland security enterprise, such as law enforcement, fire, 
industry, and labor. There were two research questions used in this project: What are the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to the effectiveness of AMSCs, and how 
can AMSCs improve their interagency collaboration to enhance the homeland security 
enterprise? Two rounds of Delphi surveys were conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of 
AMSCs. These were issued to 24 people from five Captain of the Port Zones across the 
West Coast of the United States. The survey answers were then evaluated against 
open-source reports produced by AMSCs. Between these research sources, AMSCs were 
shown to be positive collaboration and information-sharing mechanisms, but geography 
creates barriers to participation and effectiveness. In order to improve, AMSCs must 
increase funding, change policy to fund the travel and training of AMSC members, 
recruit and provide engaging training for new personnel, and establish metrics of 
performance. On the national level, all AMSCs should target and monitor common 
threats to better secure the maritime transportation system. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................2 
B. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD...........................................................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3 
1. Policy and Law ...............................................................................4 
2. Maritime Security ..........................................................................7 
3. Conclusion ....................................................................................11 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................11 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW ........................................................................12 
II. THE MARITIME THREAT LANDSCAPE AND THE ROLE OF THE 
AMSC ....................................................................................................................15 
A. MARITIME THREATS AND MARITIME SECURITY ...................15 
1. Maritime Crime ...........................................................................15 
2. Terrorism ......................................................................................16 
3. Smuggling .....................................................................................20 
4. Cybersecurity ...............................................................................21 
B. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................24 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN: DELPHI PANEL .........................................................29 
A. PORT SELECTION ................................................................................30 
B. SURVEY RESPONSES, FINDINGS, AND ANALYSIS .....................31 
1. Strengths .......................................................................................33 
2. Weaknesses ...................................................................................34 
3. Opportunities................................................................................38 
4. Threats ..........................................................................................40 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................42 
IV. ADOPTING A COLLABORATION MODEL .................................................45 
A. CAPITALIZING ON STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES..........46 
1. Recommendation for Purpose and Strategy..............................48 
2. Recommendation for Structural Flexibility ..............................49 
3. Recommendation for Incentives and Rewards..........................51 
4. Recommendation for Lateral Mechanisms ...............................53 
5. Recommendation for Individual Collaborative Capacities......53 
B. UNREPORTED CHALLENGES ...........................................................54 
1. Port Security Grant Program .....................................................54 
viii 
2. Cuts to Homeland Security Funding ..........................................54 
3. Port Security Specialists ..............................................................54 
4. Geography ....................................................................................55 
5. Cybersecurity ...............................................................................55 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.......................56 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................56 
APPENDIX A. ROUND ONE SURVEY DATA ...........................................................59 
A. SURVEY QUESTIONS ...........................................................................59 
B. SURVEY ANSWERS ..............................................................................59 
C. SURVEY ANSWERS CODED BY THEME ........................................68 
D. SURVEY ANSWERS CODED BY SWOT ...........................................73 
1. Strengths .......................................................................................73 
2. Weaknesses ...................................................................................74 
3. Opportunities................................................................................75 
4. Threats ..........................................................................................77 
APPENDIX B. ROUND TWO SURVEY DATA ..........................................................79 
A. SURVEY QUESTIONS ...........................................................................79 
B. SURVEY ANSWERS ..............................................................................80 
C. SURVEY ANSWERS CODED BY THEME ........................................87 
D. SURVEY ANSWERS CODED BY SWOT ...........................................91 
1. Strengths .......................................................................................91 
2. Weaknesses ...................................................................................92 
3. Opportunities................................................................................93 
4. Threats ..........................................................................................95 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................97 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Coast Guard Captain of the Port/AMSC Zones .........................................31 
Figure 2. Organizational Factors in Successful Collaboration ..................................46 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Survey Data Coded by Theme and SWOT ................................................32 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AIS automatic information system 
AMSC Area Maritime Security Committee 
AQ Al Qaeda  
COTP Captain of the Port 
FMSC federal maritime security coordinator 
GPS Global Positioning System  
HCPV high capacity passenger vessel  
HLS homeland security 
ICC inter-organizational collaborative capacity 
ICS industrial control system 
MHS maritime homeland security 
MTS maritime transportation system 
MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act 
P3 public–private partnership 
PSGP Port Security Grant Program 
SME subject-matter expert 
TSI transportation security incident 
UN United Nations 
VBIED vessel-borne improvised explosive device 
xiv 




Throughout the history of the United States, the country has been highly dependent 
upon the safe and secure transportation of goods and services on the world’s oceans. As 
the shipping industry and the sophistication of national and international laws have 
developed, the complexity and challenges of maritime security have grown. Traditionally, 
the concept of maritime security has referred to the military actions that nations take to 
secure critical sea lines of communication against interference from other military or sub-
national groups. Today, maritime security involves the military, police, legislative, and 
policy actions that nations take domestically and internationally to ensure the safety and 
security of the maritime domain.1 These tools of government are used to combat six threats 
that the United Nations has identified as the most significant security concerns to the 
maritime domain: the trafficking of persons, drugs, and weapons; maritime terrorism; 
crime; and piracy.2 The U.S. Coast Guard also identifies cybersecurity, active shooters, 
and the emergence of drones as threats. To address these issues, the maritime homeland 
security enterprise has evolved into a series of overlapping authorities and jurisdictions 
with each layer of government employing their legal and operational tools to tackle these 
challenges.  
When evaluating these threats to the United States, maritime crime, terrorism, 
smuggling, and cybersecurity are the most pressing issues facing the maritime homeland 
security enterprise. To address these challenges following the attacks of 9/11, Congress 
passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, which created regional Area 
Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs) led by the Coast Guard’s Captain of the Port, 
who is designated as the federal maritime security coordinator.3 AMSCs are voluntary, 
public–private partnerships composed of representatives from the security sector and 
                                                 
1 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2.  
2 United Nations General Assembly, Addendum to Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the 
Secretary-General, A/72/70 (New York: United Nations, September 6, 2017), 8, http://undocs.org/A/72/70/ 
Add.1. 
3 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002), 
https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ295/PLAW-107publ295.pdf.  
xvi 
private industry such as police, fire, maritime industry, labor, and academia.4 The purpose 
of AMSCs is to identify natural and manmade threats to the maritime transportation system 
and build and exercise response plans to counter these challenges. Interestingly, there is 
very little academic research or evaluation of their effectiveness. To evaluate the impact of 
AMSCs, this thesis posed two research questions: 1) What are the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats surrounding AMSCs and the maritime homeland security 
environment? 2) How can AMSCs prioritize their efforts and improve the quality of their 
collaboration to achieve clear benchmarks of success? To answer these research questions, 
a two-round Delphi survey was administered to 24 maritime homeland security 
professionals across the five COTP zones along the West Coast of the United States. The 
data collected were then cross-referenced with the 2016 and 2017 annual reports for 
AMSCs.  
The survey identified the strengths of AMSCs as networked collaboration and 
information sharing; the weaknesses included the geographic distance between port 
facilities, bureaucracy, and personnel turnover within the Coast Guard’s leadership. The 
opportunities include improving information sharing, and the threats to effectiveness were 
a lack of participation from outlying ports, collaboration, and geography. Given that 
collaboration across disparate homeland security professionals is crucial for AMSC 
effectiveness, the inter-organizational collaboration capacity (ICC) model was selected to 
target opportunities for improvement. This model was chosen because of its simplicity and 
clarity—with five domains and 13 sub-factors that break down the means to enhance 
interagency performance. Following the application of the ICC model, several 
recommendations emerged for ways to improve the effectiveness of the committees: 
increase funding, remove the prohibition of funding for travel of committee members, 
develop a uniform method of recruiting and training new members, and build performance 
metrics for AMSCs. At the national level, many AMSCs face similar security threats. 
These issues should be identified as key security concerns with performance milestones 
attached to threat reduction.  
                                                 
4 Maritime Security: Area Maritime Security, 33 C.F.R. § 103 (2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CFR-2010-title33-vol1/pdf/CFR-2010-title33-vol1-part103.pdf.  
xvii 
In summary, there is room for organizational improvement within the AMSC 
construct. Nevertheless, by conducting threat assessments and exercises with multiple 
organizations, AMSCs provide great value to the homeland security enterprise. These 
networked relationships and connections are the true strength of these partnerships, and 
AMSCs continue to build the security infrastructure surrounding the maritime 
transportation system.  
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The United States is a maritime nation, highly dependent on the safe and secure 
movement of goods and services across the oceans and through U.S. territorial seas. To 
support the global supply chain, the maritime industry has grown into a complex system of 
systems. Likewise, to protect U.S. security interests, the maritime homeland security 
(MHS) enterprise has evolved into a complex system of overlapping agencies, legal 
authorities, jurisdictions, and resources. This development of the MHS environment has 
created significant gaps across the various agencies governing the maritime domain. 
Recognizing these challenges, Congress directed the formation of Area Maritime Security 
Committees (AMSCs) in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.1 These 
voluntary public–private partnerships have several mandated missions that the Coast Guard 
is directed to oversee and administer. Writ large, AMSCs are supposed to plan for and try 
to prevent maritime transportation security incidents. Like many other large government 
programs, the AMSC’s performance objectives, outcomes, and accountability are ill-
defined, and independent assessments are rarely used to evaluate effectiveness. Each local 
committee provides an annual report to Coast Guard headquarters, which in turn releases 
a summary of self-reported—and anecdotal—challenges, suggestions, accomplishments, 
and best practices.2  
The Coast Guard does a good job of collecting and consolidating feedback from 
AMSCs, and the annual AMSC reports identify threats and suggest solutions to enhance 
the safety and security of the maritime domain.3 But the absence of explicit definitions and 
metrics of “success”—beyond the sweeping goal of preventing terrorist attacks—has 
resulted in somewhat circular and meaningless accounting. As mentioned previously, 
                                                 
1 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002), 
https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ295/PLAW-107publ295.pdf. 
2 U.S. Coast Guard, Area Maritime Security Committees 2017 Annual Report: Challenges, 
Suggestions, Accomplishments, and Best Practices (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, 2018), 
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-FAC/Documents/AMSC%20Consolidated%20reports/ 
2017/2017%20Consolidated%20AMSC%20Report.pdf?ver=2018-07-20-081358-730. 
3 U.S. Coast Guard. 
2 
AMSCs are collaborative bodies, but because the mere act of collaborating is conflated 
with purpose (and success), the annual reports are an accounting of meetings, exercises, 
training, and operations.4 Collaboration is not an end unto itself; rather, it is a process 
undertaken in service to an outcome, purpose, or goal. Until more tangible, intermediate, 
and quantifiable (or verifiable) goals are set, neither the Coast Guard nor the participants 
in AMSCs can have a precise sense of how well they are collaborating. Because AMSCs 
are voluntary, it is reasonable to assume they are in some way, or to some degree, beneficial 
for all parties. It would seem prudent to know with greater certainty, though, exactly how 
beneficial and in what ways and to which participants. This information would allow both 
the Coast Guard and the participants in AMSCs to ensure the best use of time and resources, 
to identify opportunities for improvement, and to prioritize their areas of effort. Finally, it 
would enable the stakeholders to leverage existing, useful models for successful 
collaboration toward a clear purpose.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats surrounding area 
maritime security committees and the maritime homeland security environment? How can 
AMSCs prioritize their efforts and improve the quality of their collaboration to achieve 
clear benchmarks of success? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
There are several reasons this research is significant to the field of homeland 
security. AMSCs are a unique concept in the homeland security (HLS) enterprise; there are 
other public–private partnerships (P3s), but none are similarly structured, nor are they as 
localized as AMSCs. There are two relevant examples of P3s that the HLS enterprise has 
created to communicate threats and generate policy. The TSA has the Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee, which is a national-level policy advisory committee.5 Another 
national security industry intelligence P3 is the Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
                                                 
4 U.S. Coast Guard. 
5 “Aviation Security Advisory Committee,” Transportation Security Administration, accessed 
December 7, 2018, https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/aviation-security. 
3 
(ISAC).6 These are information and intelligence diffusion tools for specific industries, but 
they do not conduct operational planning or exercises. The key difference between these 
two types of advisory committees and AMSCs is that AMSCs are regional or local P3s that 
conduct threat assessments, build plans, and conduct operational exercises to enhance the 
maritime security within their Captain of the Port (COTP) Zone.  
Because of their uniqueness and the narrow scope of MHS, there is little research 
on or understanding of how well AMSCs are performing their mandated roles and 
objectives. Therefore, this research project is an attempt to provide an independent 
assessment of AMSCs by surveying subject-matter experts across five COTP zones. A 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis model of AMSCs was 
completed using data from the surveys. The SWOT method is a common organizational 
assessment tool used across business and government to identify internal strengths and 
weaknesses and external opportunities and threats. The benefit of this analytic tool is that 
it is widely understood and can be easily applied to facilitate organizational improvement.7 
The SWOT data was then coded and applied to the inter-organizational collaboration 
capacity (ICC) model to identify ways for AMSCs to enhance their performance.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides an overview of relevant written work surrounding 
the roles and responsibilities of AMSCs in securing the maritime domain. The literature is 
categorized into three general topics: policy, law, and maritime security. The known 
information in these fields comes from policy documents from the Bush and Obama 
administrations, think tanks, non-profit organizations, AMSC open-source reports, federal 
law, and academic research.  
                                                 
6 “Home Page,” National Council of ISACs, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.nationalisacs. 
org/. 
7 Harald A. Friedl, The SAGE International Encyclopedia of Travel and Tourism (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE, 2017) 1204–1206. 
4 
1. Policy and Law 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, elements of the U.S. government 
recognized significant gaps in the security of the maritime domain. As a result, Congress 
passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002.8 The MTSA directed 
improvements in the prevention and response to the threats of maritime terrorism. 
Additionally, § 70102 requires that the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
conduct vulnerability assessments of every port complex.9 With these assessments, the 
secretary must build a national maritime transportation security plan and establish the role 
of the federal maritime security coordinator (FMSC).10 This person is functionally 
responsible for all maritime security response operations within the Sector or COTP zone 
and generates area maritime security plans.11 The MTSA also establishes a mechanism for 
federal funding to develop the MHS enterprise through the Port Security Grant Program 
(PSGP).12 In 2006 Congress passed the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port 
Act.13 This law amended the MTSA by changing the distribution method for grant funding 
from “a fair and equitable” manner to “the allocation of funds based on risk.”14 Today, the 
PSGP is a $100 million initiative administered by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, and local AMSCs are awarding and distributing the funds.15 Captain Paul Arnett 
identified several recommendations to improve the management of the PSGP in his 2016 
Naval Postgraduate School thesis.16 He also did an excellent job of summarizing the 
interplay among the various laws, regulations, and agency policy memos that applies to the 
                                                 
8 Maritime Transportation Security Act. 
9 Maritime Transportation Security Act, § 70104. 
10 Maritime Transportation Security Act, § 70104. 
11 Maritime Transportation Security Act, § 70103. 
12 Maritime Transportation Security Act, § 70107. 
13 Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347 (2006), 
https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ347/PLAW-109publ347.pdf. 
14 SAFE Port Act, § 112.  
15 “Fiscal Year 2017 Port Security Grant Program,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, last 
modified June 2, 2017, https://www.fema.gov/fiscal-year-2017-port-security-grant-program. 
16 Paul D. J. Arnett, “The Port Security Grant Program: Good Enough, or Can It Be Made Better?,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2016), xvi–xix, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/ 
49476. 
5 
MHS enterprise. However, his research focused on reducing risk through better 
management of the PSGP.17 Because of Captain Arnett’s specific focus on risk reduction 
and the grant process, his research is not relevant to the effectiveness of AMSC but rather 
a discussion on improving the MHS environment through better grant administration.  
Following the passage of the MTSA, President Bush signed Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-13.18 This policy document directed the establishment of 
the Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee, formed from the President’s 
cabinet-level executives.19 HSPD-13 also directed the writing of several national strategy 
documents including the National Strategy for Maritime Security.20 The Department of 
Homeland Security in concert with multiple agencies produced five policy documents that 
compose this national strategy.21 Two elements of the National Strategy provide relevant 
policy guidance and strategic goals worth exploring. The first is the Maritime 
Transportation System Security Recommendations.22 This document seeks to “Create a 
coordinated network of stakeholders who: (1) understand and accept their 
role/responsibility for ensuring maritime security, [and] (2) are actively engaged in 
collaborative efforts to reduce security risks in the Maritime Domain.”23 The second 
relevant policy document is the Maritime Commerce Security Plan.24 This is one of the 
only federal documents that clearly articulates an objective for securing the MTS: “To 
improve the security of the maritime supply chain, to lower the risk that it will be used to 
                                                 
17 Arnett, 19–36. 
18 George Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 13, “Maritime Security Policy” 
(Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2004), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf. 
19 Bush, 4.  
20 Bush, 5.  
21 “National Strategy for Maritime Security,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 
7, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/national-plan-achieve-maritime-domain-awareness. 
22 Department of Homeland Security, Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations for 
the National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, October 
2005), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSPD_MTSSPlan_0.pdf.  
23 Department of Homeland Security, Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations. 
24 Department of Homeland Security, The Maritime Commerce Security Plan for the National Strategy 
for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, October 2005), https://www. 
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSPD_MCSPlan_0.pdf. 
6 
support terrorism, criminal or other unlawful or hostile acts, reduce the vulnerability of the 
Maritime Domain, and protect and facilitate lawful maritime commerce.”25  
Another series of regulations that govern the technical security standards for 
facilities, vessels, and the conduct of AMSCs is 33 C.F.R. § 101–105.26 Further guidance 
on the conduct and management of AMSCs comes from the USCG’s Navigation and 
Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 09-02.27 This document provides specific doctrine and 
detailed instructions for things such as assigning committee members and the format of the 
area maritime security plan.28 This NVIC also provides uniformity for the structure, 
management, and conduct of AMSCs throughout the nation.29 To document performance, 
the U.S. Coast Guard produces an annual report on the “challenges, suggestions, 
accomplishments, and best practices” of AMSCs across the country.30 This report and its 
appendices provide a consolidated list of feedback and input from every AMSC. This 
document shows clear points of concern and numerous opportunities for improvement in 
MHS operations, legislation, and management. However, there is not a clear methodology 
to evaluate what is presented. This report contains over 125 individual challenges that each 
AMSC is facing, some with clear recommendations, others with no recommendation or 
proposed solution.31 This paints a picture of the good effort and intentions but sub-optimal 
performance measurements of success or effectiveness.  
In summary, the MTSA of 2002 directed the creation of P3s in the form of AMSCs, 
led by the FMSC.32 This law was further reinforced by agency rulemaking in 33 C.F.R. 
§ 103, which provides some level of technical guidance on how AMSCs are to be organized 
                                                 
25 Department of Homeland Security, Maritime Commerce Security Plan.  
26 Maritime Security, 33 C.F.R. §§ 101–105 (2010). 
27 U.S. Coast Guard, Guidelines for Port Security Committees, and Port Security Plans Required for 
U.S. Ports, NVIC 09-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Transportation, 2002), 
https://media.defense.gov/2017/Jul/14/2001777940/-1/-1/0/9-02.PDF. 
28 U.S. Coast Guard, Guidelines for Port Security Committees.  
29 U.S. Coast Guard, Guidelines for Port Security Committees. 
30 U.S. Coast Guard, 2017 Annual Report. 
31 U.S. Coast Guard, 2017 Annual Report. 
32 Maritime Transportation Security Act, § 70104. 
7 
and what they are expected to accomplish.33 Because of the broad interpretation of 33 
C.F.R. § 103, the Coast Guard issued NVIC 09-02 to standardize the plans and general 
administration of AMSCs across the country.34 As the laws and regulations were being 
created, the implementation was guided by strategic-level policy such as the National 
Strategy for Maritime Security and HSPD-13.35   
2. Maritime Security 
Historically, maritime security has referred to nation-state control of the oceans 
through formal naval sea power.36 However, the definition and idea of maritime security 
have grown substantially over the last 30 years. In 1999, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast 
Guard attempted to forecast the political and strategic environment of the world’s oceans 
by 2020.37 In their future assessment, the U.S. naval intelligence community identified 
multiple elements that compose the modern principle of maritime security “broadly in a 
national security context to include the protection of all of the nation’s interests on the 
seas.”38 The 2020 analysis also has several categorizations of threats to the safety of life at 
sea.39 This is important as safety risks pose significant security threats to the nation-state 
as well. Taking a more focused view, security author David Sloggett describes seven 
components of maritime security in his book The Anarchic Sea.40 Much like the threat 
estimate for 2020, Sloggett identifies the key role of nation-states in the maritime domain: 
“Maritime security is all about trying to bring governance to these potentially anarchic 
                                                 
33 Maritime Security: Area Maritime Security, 33 C.F.R. § 103 (2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CFR-2010-title33-vol1/pdf/CFR-2010-title33-vol1-part103.pdf. 
34 U.S. Coast Guard, Guidelines for Port Security Committees. 
35 Bush, HSPD-13. 
36 Basil Germond, “The Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 54 (December 
2014): 138.  
37 Office of Naval Intelligence and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, Threats and 
Challenges to Maritime Security 2020 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 1999), i, 
https://fas.org/irp/threat/maritime2020/TITLE.htm.  
38 Office of Naval Intelligence and U.S. Coast Guard, i.  
39 Office of Naval Intelligence and U.S. Coast Guard, i. 
40 David Sloggett, The Anarchic Sea (London: C. Hurst, 2013), 36–38. 
8 
situations, so that their impact can be controlled.”41 Where Slogged falls short from a more 
contemporary perspective is in the role of preventive legislation and administrative controls 
placed on the maritime industry. He does not reference the regulations enacted by the 
international community used to minimize threats to vessels, crews, and ports. Sloggett’s 
central theme is the geopolitical and military security of the maritime domain.42 
Applying a holistic approach, the MHS enterprise includes enhanced ship and cargo 
security standards, stewardship of the environment, and significantly improved crew-
training and security capabilities. Merging these ideas of sea power and regulatory action, 
maritime policy researcher and lecturer Basil Germond describes maritime security as “as 
a set of policies, regulations, measures and operations” taken to ensure the security of the 
transportation system and the maritime domain.43 Bueger, another security policy 
researcher adds factors that enhance economic development, national security, human 
security, marine safety, and environmental protection of the maritime domain.44 This is an 
altruistic approach to the use of the oceans and one that requires all players to adopt a 
uniform set of standards that equally offset the costs of safety and security across the 
maritime industry.45 On the other hand, Marlow makes the point that voluntary compliance 
with security regulations imposes a cost only on those who “volunteer” to follow a higher 
standard of safety and security.46 Thus, Marlow’s work implies that regulation is good for 
the industry because it mandates best practices that reduce risk and enforces a uniform cost 
of security and safety across the maritime industry.  
One of the more recent and relevant research papers to address maritime security 
threats is a Naval Postgraduate School thesis by Eng Hoch Tng. 47 Eng defines the history 
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of various maritime terrorist organizations and outlines the motives and targets for 
maritime terrorism and piracy.48 He also paints a picture of the permissive operational 
environment that enables maritime terrorism and piracy to flourish.49 In a 2008 study of 
maritime terrorism, Peter Chalk with the RAND Corporation defines seven factors that 
facilitate maritime piracy and five similar factors that enable or encourage maritime 
terrorism.50 Chalk also provides a review of the various actions the U.S. government and 
the international community have taken to counter these geopolitical security issues.51 
Chalk concludes his study with several positive suggestions for U.S. policymakers to 
enhance the maritime security environment. However, the assumption he makes is that 
governments exist in a world of unlimited budgets and human resources to tackle all known 
security problems in the maritime domain.52 Eng and Chalk align on the factors that enable 
successful maritime terrorist activities. A lack of governmental control or maritime 
enforcement over the land and territorial seas surrounding their operating area enables bad 
actors to flourish.53 However, Eng makes a stronger argument for the success of maritime 
terrorism, specifically that having a “maritime tradition” is a factor in the effective 
exploitation of the maritime domain.54 Chalk discusses how increased access to 
recreational sporting equipment and minimal crew staffing allow terrorists access to 
targets.55 While recreational sports gear certainly can give more access, such equipment 
does not readily translate into effective tactics. 
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A second study by the RAND Corporation focuses on the liability associated with 
a terrorist attack on high-capacity passenger vessels and container ships.56 This is one of 
the few documents to look at the threats to high-capacity passenger vessels and discuss 
container ships as a means to introduce weapons of mass destruction into the United 
States.57 One significant shortfall in the 2006 RAND study, much like with Eng’s work, is 
the failure to consider the possibility of a mass-shooting or lone-wolf attack on these 
vessels.58 Although a relatively new tactic in the Western world, at the time of Eng’s thesis, 
such attacks were a known threat that could easily be applied to the maritime environment.  
Because of the international nature of the maritime industry, the United Nations 
(UN) has long held a key role in the safety and security of the oceans. Based on the need 
for global acknowledgment of common concerns, the UN General Assembly produces the 
annual Oceans and the Law of the Sea report.59 This report documents the broad spectrum 
of international problem areas from year to year. In some instances, the UN provides an 
itemized list of threats and challenges, but in other years, it limits its views of maritime 
security, focusing more on environmental issues such as the impact of man-made acoustic 
noise on the marine habitat.60 These reports are beneficial to the maritime community 
because they speak to the concerns of the global community. However, the challenge with 
any democratic process is that not all voices are equal, and key themes can be suppressed 
by political coalitions with a vested interest in the status quo. A nearly universal concept 
among all the authors is the importance to understand maritime security as a “transnational 
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task.”61 This requires a collective effort across militaries, governments, and the private 
sector to achieve a true state of security in the maritime domain. 
3. Conclusion 
There are several thousand legal, policy, and historical documents on the various 
aspects of maritime security. The written works surveyed for this literature review 
represent a small portion of the potential readings in the field. These documents were 
chosen due to their relevance to AMSCs, the field of maritime homeland security, and their 
recent publication. There is ample written work on the legislation and policy surrounding 
AMSCs, and there is substantial research on maritime security and terrorism. Of significant 
note, there was not substantial academic or written work on the roles and successes of P3s 
in securing the maritime domain, and virtually nothing was written on the performance of 
AMSCs. Therefore, further research is warranted on this topic.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to assess the effectiveness of AMSCs, a qualitative Delphi survey of 
subject-matter experts (SMEs) was conducted in the late summer and early fall of 2018. 
The purpose of a Delphi panel is to query SMEs on a particular topic and gather collective 
feedback through multiple survey rounds.62 Through each subsequent round, the 
participants were given previous survey answers that were thematically focused or 
represented a specific point of interest to the researcher.63 Thus, the collaborative answers 
from each subsequent round of SMEs provided the opportunity to reflect and comment on 
the answers provided by others.64  
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The literature on Delphi surveys recommends limiting the survey size to 10–18 
individuals.65 In order to restrict the size of the SME candidate pool, a geographic range of 
the West Coast of the United States was selected. This allowed for the recruitment of 
personnel involved in the security and operations of large, medium, and small port 
facilities. The individuals recruited for the survey spanned the full spectrum of private 
industry, public sector, and security services such as police and fire departments. Upon 
completion of each round of surveys, the data were segregated by question and then coded 
by specific theme. These themes were then evaluated against the SWOT model to identify 
opportunities for organizational improvement in the function and execution of AMSCs. 
SWOT provided a snapshot of the current state of the committees, which can be used to 
plan and prioritize tasks while the ICC Model highlighted clear opportunities to enhance 
interagency collaboration. Using both of these tools allowed the research to identify key 
opportunities for organizational improvement of AMSCs across the country.  
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides a summary of the evolution of maritime security from formal 
naval sea power to the legislative creation of AMSCs to secure the maritime domain. This 
chapter discusses the threats of maritime crime, terrorism, and smuggling and recent 
examples of targeted attacks domestically and abroad with actions taken by AMSCs to 
address these threats.  
Chapter III reviews the research methods that were employed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of AMSCs. This section also provides a brief explanation of the ports along 
the West Coast from which individuals were selected for participation in this project. Then, 
the survey results are broken into strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Using 
the SWOT model, the survey answers were cross-referenced with the 2016 and 2017 
annual reports of the AMSCs to identify key themes and takeaways.  
Chapter IV discusses the totality of the project, revisiting the thesis statement and 
research question. The chapter then articulates the implementation of the ICC Model and 
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its relevance to AMSCs. Using this as a baseline, the AMSC survey feedback and the 
annual reports are consolidated to formulate recommendations and targeted areas of 
improvement. The chapter then discusses findings that were not reported in great depth but 
were recurrent themes, such as Port Security Grant funding and geography.  
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II. THE MARITIME THREAT LANDSCAPE AND THE ROLE 
OF THE AMSC 
This thesis focuses on the actions that the U.S. Coast Guard is taking to strengthen 
the MHS enterprise. To provide context for AMSCs, this chapter discusses their formation, 
recent and relevant maritime security threats, and the ways in which AMSCs are working 
to strengthen the MHS environment. 
A. MARITIME THREATS AND MARITIME SECURITY 
U.S. naval forces define maritime security as “tasks and operations conducted to 
protect sovereignty and maritime resources, support free and open seaborne commerce, 
and to counter piracy, crime, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne 
immigration.”66 These operational concepts are echoed by the UN in its 2017 report on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea.67 This report outlines six threats to international maritime 
security: trafficking in persons, drugs, and weapons; maritime terrorism; crime; and 
piracy.68 In order to counter these threats, the international community and the United 
States have taken significant regulatory, legal, military, and police actions to mitigate these 
challenges. Because of the layers of security and regulatory oversight, not all of the threats 
identified by the UN are of immediate concern to the United States. For instance, this thesis 
does not discuss maritime piracy because it is a low probability incident in U.S. waters, 
and AMSCs do not spend significant time or effort on counterpiracy planning or exercises. 
Therefore, the threat evaluations in this chapter focus on crime; terrorism; the smuggling 
of people, narcotics, and weapons; and cybersecurity.  
1. Maritime Crime 
In recent years, the most prevalent forms of maritime crime have involved armed 
boarding parties climbing onto vessels in transit through areas of narrow sea lines of 
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communication, such as the Malacca Strait, or while at anchorage in underdeveloped 
nations. These types of robberies have generally focused on stealing small items that can 
be readily sold or consumed such as food, alcohol, and tobacco. From 2014 to June 2018 
in the Gulf of Guinea, there were 532 reported attempted or successful attacks on merchant 
ships.69 During the same period, there were 716 attacks that occurred against merchant 
vessels in Southeast Asia.70 Many of these events were documented and reported to 
authorities as unsuccessful or attempted attacks. The number of unsuccessful attacks is 
interesting to note because it suggests the difficulty of successful maritime robbery. The 
oceans are a volatile workplace, and the primary target generally takes active measures to 
counter bad actors. The second principle evidenced by these numbers is that there is a lively 
criminal element in the maritime domain seeking to exploit the largely unarmed 
commercial shipping industry. Despite the fact that most of these issues occur in far-flung 
regions of the world, attacking the maritime industry compromises the security of the MTS 
as a whole. A security issue on a vessel in West Africa can be easily transported to the East 
Coast of the United States and should not be ignored.  
AMSCs are not actively working toward maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea 
or the Malacca Strait per se. They are, however, building plans and conducting security 
exercises throughout the territorial seas of the United States to ensure the safe and secure 
movement of people, vessels, and cargo within the territorial seas. These preventive, 
preparatory activities are essential to ensuring the whole-of-government response to a 
broad spectrum of threats to the MTS.  
2. Terrorism  
Unlike robbery and piracy, terrorism in the maritime domain is a relatively new 
phenomenon. One of the reasons for this is that the marine environment is not an easy place 
to make a name for oneself as a terrorist. In general, it is a hostile operating area, which 
requires some experience with boats in order to be remotely effective. An example of this 
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is the first attempt to attack a U.S. naval vessel in the port of Aiden, Yemen. In January 
2000, Al Qaeda (AQ) operatives tried to target USS The Sullivans with a vessel-borne 
improvised explosive device (VBIED).71 This attempt failed because of operator 
inexperience: the VBIED sank at the boat launch because the terrorists had grossly 
overloaded it.72 Despite their initial failure, AQ pressed ahead and carried out a successful 
attack on USS Cole 10 months later, killing 17 Sailors and crippling a U.S. naval warship.73  
An additional challenge with maritime terrorism is the lack of media access. 
Terrorists are generally seeking an audience for their actions. When their events occur 
miles out to sea, far away from media outlets, even a successful attack will likely have 
minimal coverage due to the challenges of getting to the incident. An example of this is the 
attack on the French oil tanker, MV Limburg. In this instance, it is believed that AQ 
operatives successfully assaulted the ship with a VBIED off the coast of Yemen.74 The 
vessel was set afire, and one crewmember was killed. The ship, however, was salvaged, 
and little media interest was given despite the vessel being successfully attacked.75 This 
event highlights another problem with targeting large ships: they are built with redundant 
safety systems and manned with crews trained to respond to a wide variety of emergencies. 
Although not difficult to find and hit, large merchant ships are engineered for safety and 
resiliency. This reduces the likely success and minimizes the impact of an attack.  
Despite these deterrent factors, maritime terrorism is still a legitimate concern for 
governments and industries around the world. Boats are inherently dangerous, and there is 
a significant potential to weaponize the cargo or the vessel. In recent history, there are 
multiple examples of ships that have exploded and caused major damage to the surrounding 
areas. One of the most significant accidents in maritime history occurred in Halifax, 
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Canada, in 1916.76 A military munitions ship collided with another vessel, caught fire, and 
quickly exploded, instantly killing more than 1,900 people and severely wounding an 
additional 9,000.77 This incident caused port authorities around the world to reassess the 
management and handling of certain dangerous cargoes.78 The Houston-Galveston AMSC, 
in fact, listed the movement and tracking of especially hazardous cargoes in and out of U.S. 
ports as a major security challenge.79 This issue highlights a lack of maritime domain 
awareness as these highly volatile industrial chemicals are transported into and out of U.S. 
ports. Houston is not alone in this challenge; there are dozens of highly explosive or toxic 
industrial chemicals shipped in bulk quantities into U.S. ports, and significant accidents 
with these cargoes continue to occur.80 Another possible means of weaponizing 
commercial vessels is to use the ship as a ramming weapon against other vessels. No 
relevant example of this type of attack exists, and there are some significant challenges for 
the attacker using this tactic. A person would have to get control of the bridge and the 
engine room of the vessel and be competent enough to pilot the ship into another target. 
On the surface, this scenario seems far-fetched and unlikely. However, the 9/11 hijackers 
overcame similar obstacles successfully; therefore, the potential to use a ship for this 
purpose should not be ignored or discounted.  
One of the most likely terrorist targets is high-capacity passenger vessels (HCPVs). 
Modern cruise ships can carry over 8,800 people in a highly confined environment, which 
presents a tempting target of opportunity.81 There are a few recent historical examples of 
attacks on HCPVs. In 2004, Abu Sayyaf militants successfully bombed a Philippine ferry 
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that caused a fire and killed 100 people.82 Recently, an explosion on board a ferry in 
Mexico injured 25 people including several American tourists.83 One of the most 
significant threats to HCPVs is an active-shooter scenario. In the United States from 2016 
through 2017, there were 50 mass shootings resulting in 221 people killed and 722 
wounded.84 This troubling trend has yet to transition to the maritime world. However, this 
type of attack seems imminent given the number of public and private HCPVs, the ready 
access to military grade weapons, and some of the successes of homegrown extremists. In 
order to address this threat, numerous AMSCs have built and exercised interagency 
response plans for a variety of terrorist scenarios such as active-shooter or multi-pronged 
attacks.85 One of the reasons that this type of event has the potential to be so catastrophic 
is that once a vessel is underway, getting first responders to the vessel to mitigate the threat 
can be quite difficult. This time delay would allow attackers to carry out their assault longer 
than they would in a land-based environment.  
Despite the low number of actual incidents, the opportunity for terrorism in the 
maritime environment remains high. The volatile nature of the cargo, the significant 
environmental and economic impact, and the large number of people on HCPVs create a 
broad range of targets for a willing attacker to exploit. AMSCs are taking active measures 
to address several of the known terrorist threats such as active-shooter scenarios and 
radiation detection.  
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3. Smuggling 
In 1790, the U.S. Congress passed the Revenue Marine Act, a law that established 
the Revenue Cutter Service as one of the country’s first maritime security forces.86 This 
agency was established to enforce customs taxes and prevent smuggling by vessels 
bringing goods into the newly formed nation. As was the case in 1790, today, maritime 
smuggling of people, narcotics, and weapons remains a major concern for governments 
around the world. According to the UN, of the approximately 170,000 people who 
attempted to migrate to Europe by sea in 2017, more than 3,000 lost their lives in the 
journey.87 In 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted 6,346 people attempting to enter the 
United States illegally across maritime borders.88 During the same period, it also 
interdicted 201 metric tons, or 201,000 kg, of cocaine.89 As opposed to people and drugs, 
the smuggling of weapons into the United States is not a common phenomenon but is a 
significant security concern. To reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction entering 
the United States, the U.S. government has established electronic monitoring at the ports 
of entry and along the borders for nuclear materials. This increases the probability of 
finding these materials, and it is likely that groups intent on this action are aware of U.S. 
detection capabilities. Because of the seriousness of this issue and the threat to the nation, 
AMSCs have continued to harden the maritime border. In 2017, several AMSCs conducted 
extensive outreach, exercises, and equipment purchases for local law enforcement to 
increase the chances of finding radiological materials before they make landfall.90 In 
summary, the smuggling of drugs and people into the country is an ongoing security 
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concern, and AMSCs are taking active measures to prevent the importation of nuclear 
materials.91  
4. Cybersecurity 
The last relevant threat to the maritime transportation system involves 
cybersecurity. Based on the recent number of cyberattacks in the maritime domain, this is 
one of the most emergent and significant threats to the MTS. Within the modern maritime 
industry, there are three electronic systems, each with significant vulnerabilities: the 
automatic information system (AIS)/Global Positioning System (GPS), the internal control 
system (ICS), and the cargo management systems. The global supply chain, on both land 
and sea, largely depends on the Global Navigation Satellite System. The GPS signal is sent 
from 31 medium earth orbit satellites in an un-coded radio signal across the surface of the 
planet.92 The problem with this radio signal is that the GPS transmissions can be jammed 
or spoofed. In 2017, over 20 vessels operating on the Black Sea reported receiving a GPS 
vessel position vastly different from their actual physical locations.93 What is interesting 
about this incident is the proximity of the vessels to Russia and the final input signal placing 
all the ships at an airport inside Russian territory.94 Because of the large area of sea that 
was impacted by this event, it appears to have been a land-based, state spoofing attack or 
exercise by a sophisticated actor. It is likely this attack involved military-grade jamming 
technology. However, this does not preclude terrorist organizations from performing 
something similar on a much smaller level. For example, groups could target a single vessel 
and convince the operator to take a deliberate action that would unknowingly place the ship 
in danger.  
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In 2013, researchers from the University of Texas were able to hack the GPS signal 
of a 65m yacht on the Mediterranean Sea.95 Once they established control of the signal, 
they altered the digital inputs to the vessel and convinced the operator to adjust the vessel’s 
course to a fictional navigational track line and steer the vessel away from its intended 
location.96 This simulated event demonstrates that the signal can be hijacked, causing 
vessel operators to take actions that put their ships and crews in danger. The apparent GPS 
spoofing by the Russian government and the hacking of a single underway vessel indicate 
an overreliance on these systems as well as their vulnerability.  
Along with the GPS, the AIS system is a key navigational component to merchant 
vessels as it provides a position, speed, and closest point of approach to all vessels using 
AIS in the immediate area.97 While the GPS system is vulnerable only through the radio 
signal, AIS is vulnerable through the World Wide Web and the radio signal.98 Because of 
the interconnection of the AIS with GPS and RADAR, a hacker can paint targets on the 
vessel operator’s chart display or produce false positioning information for a vessel or the 
ships around it. This combination of disinformation may cause the master to make 
maneuvers that lead to a collision or grounding.99  
Today, modern vessels depend almost entirely on electronic navigational systems; 
they are also highly reliant on logistics management software. Because of the complexity 
of the global supply chain, logistics companies have converted their entire systems of cargo 
management to interconnected databases. As with all electronic systems, these can be 
manipulated. In 2017, Maersk Shipping Lines was hacked by a NotPetya ransomware 
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attack, resulting in a total shutdown of all of their cargo tracking systems.100 This attack 
caused the company to completely replace all of its IT infrastructure, which remarkably 
resulted in only a 20 percent reduction in operating capacity.101 This seems contradictory 
to the information contained in the 2017 AMSC report, wherein the Central California 
AMSC reported a nearly complete shut-down of the Maersk/APM Terminal for five days 
and limited operations for 14 days.102 In September 2018, the Port of San Diego was also 
the target of a ransomware attack.103 Although apparently not as crippling as the Maersk 
incident, at the time of this writing, impacts to the governance and operation of this port 
have persisted.104 In a different spin on the use of technology, drug-trafficking 
organizations hacked into the cargo management computers in the port of Antwerp to 
monitor and control the movement of containerized drug shipments into Europe.105 These 
examples of cyberattacks are clearly for-profit ventures, and it is highly probable that the 
number and variety of attacks on the maritime industry will increase in the future.  
While ransomware continues to provide a clear profit motive for criminal acts in 
the cyber domain, an additional threat exists for industrial sabotage. There are significant 
vulnerabilities in the ICS operating in ports and on ships around the world. In this scenario, 
a hacker could remotely take control of a large merchant vessel and ram the ship into other 
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vessels or run it aground to endanger the personnel and cargo on board. There is research 
on this topic identifying the vulnerability of these electronic systems.106  
In both the 2016 and 2017 annual AMSC reports, the Coast Guard lists 
cybersecurity as one of its top concerns.107 In Enclosure 1 of each of these documents, the 
feedback is consistent from year to year with extensive comments that suggest AMSCs are 
ill-prepared to deal with the quickly evolving cyber-security threat: “The rapid progression 
of software development and the technical aspects of thwarting cyber-incidents or attacks 
presents serious constraints to the maritime industry and Coast Guard personnel who have 
limited knowledge of computer systems and cyber technology.”108 The Coast Guard’s 
Cyber Strategy describes the organization’s cyber domain concept: “We will ensure the 
security of our cyberspace, maintain superiority over our adversaries, and safeguard our 
Nation’s critical maritime infrastructure.”109 While the stated vision is well-intentioned, 
there is a clear gap between it and the actual capability of securing and protecting the cyber-
reliant environment of the maritime transportation system. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Maritime security has evolved from being a concept of naval ships and national 
security to include an overarching set of policies, laws, and actions by the government, 
police, and military forces to secure the seas, maritime borders, and ports against criminal 
actors.110 The UN has collectively put forth a list of six significant threats to the maritime 
community and identified cybersecurity as a growing concern while the Coast Guard 
identifies cybersecurity, unmanned aerial systems, and active-shooter events as emergent 
threats.111 Following the attacks of 9/11, the United States initiated a series of policy and 
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legislative actions to bolster the MHS enterprise, beginning with the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002.112 This law was a major leap forward in attempting 
to address several known weaknesses in the U.S. maritime security posture. The first 
problem the law addressed was a lack of systematic port and maritime facility security 
planning.113 Until the passage of the MTSA, there were minimal requirements for ports as 
a whole or individual facility operators to have established emergency action plans.114 
Congress recognized the need for a coordinated effort between the government and the 
private sector in strengthening the MHS enterprise. Therefore, the MTSA directed the 
formation of Maritime Security Advisory Committees at the national level.115 The law 
further authorizes lower echelons of Coast Guard commands to establish an “Area 
Maritime Security Advisory Committee for any port area of the United States.”116 To 
ensure that the private sector has had an appropriate and balanced role in these committees, 
the MTSA and subsequent federal regulations have required equal representation from both 
the public and private sector interests.117 Therefore membership on local- and national-
level Maritime Security Committees must be composed of Coast Guard personnel, the 
maritime industry, law enforcement, labor, trade representatives, the academic community, 
and state or local government.118 In theory, this broad, collaborative foundation creates the 
opportunity to identify threats and address concerns from all corners of the MTS. The 
MTSA of 2002 also authorized the administration of grants to strengthen and advance the 
MHS enterprise throughout the ports of America.119 The role of grant administration is a 
significant tool in strengthening the HLS enterprise and also an incentive for active 
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participation in AMSCs. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security made $100 million 
of Port Security Grant Program funding available to 
owners or operators of Federally-regulated terminals, facilities, U.S. 
inspected passenger vessels or ferries, . . . [and] members of an AMSC. 
Specifically, eligible applicants include port authorities, port police, local 
law enforcement agencies, port and local fire departments, and facility fire 
brigades that have jurisdictional authority to respond to incidents in the 
port.120 
Congress followed the passage of the MTSA in 2002 with the Secure 
Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act in 2006.121 This law subtly changed how the 
PSGP was administered, modifying the text of the MTSA from an “equitable allocation of 
funds” to an “allocation of funds based on risk.”122 This change was meant to prevent a 
misallocation of HLS resources but has had the unintended consequence of providing more 
resources to organizations and communities that already have a significant economic 
advantage. One example is New York City. This port complex has a higher risk factor 
based on vessel traffic and the surrounding population, yet it also has one of the most robust 
maritime security apparatuses in the country. In 2017, the NYPD received $10.8 million 
and the FDNY $5.2 million in PSGP funding; two agencies in the same city received 
16 percent of all PSGP funding for the entire nation.123 Arguably, this funding model 
hardens the already strong and resilient while doing little for the small and weak in the 
MHS enterprise. The SAFE Ports Act also clarified the expectations of drills, exercises, 
and emergency response plans that AMSCs and individual facility operators are required 
to develop.124 The specific purpose of AMSCs and the legislation and policy surrounding 
them is to prevent or enhance the response to a transportation security incident. By 
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providing this overarching legislation and policy guidance, in theory, the Coast Guard and 
its partner agencies are preparing for and responding to a broad spectrum of homeland 
security threats within the maritime domain. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN: DELPHI PANEL 
The goal of this research project was to assess the perceived effectiveness of 
AMSCs, generate SWOT analysis to prioritize efforts, and then to leverage collaboration 
models for more concrete, measurable performance. The first stage of this research was to 
confirm and understand the actual value of AMSC membership to its participants. As noted 
previously, collaboration is not an end unto itself; in this case, it is conducted ostensibly to 
enable the participants—either individually or together—to prevent terrorism. The 
constituent or intermediate goals in achieving the overarching purpose have never been 
articulated, much less benchmarked and measured. With no data available to analyze 
AMSCs deductively, the only way to identify possible improvements was to capture the 
status quo and to work inductively to what is possible, feasible, and preferable.  
Therefore a qualitative Delphi survey of SMEs from diverse stakeholder groups at 
maritime port facilities across the western United States was conducted. The survey was 
sent in two consecutive rounds to 24 personnel who hold management roles in maritime 
transportation or maritime safety and security. The first round was designed to elicit broad 
feedback on the performance of AMSCs, with open-ended questions regarding their 
purpose, effectiveness, benefits of membership, and successes. Responses from the first 
round were consolidated, and key words derived from the responses representing 
“effectiveness” and “collaboration” were used to code the responses. The second round of 
survey questions focused on unusual or outlier answers from the first round and on issues 
for which concrete proposals for improvement might be possible.125 The second round 
allowed participants to validate, disagree with, or elaborate on previous answers given by 
other participants in the previous round.126 In addition to the two rounds of surveys, the 
common issues and responses were then cross-referenced with the 2016 and 2017 annual 
reports for AMSCs to validate common opinions. 
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A. PORT SELECTION 
According to the methodological literature, the ideal Delphi survey size is 10–18 
respondents.127 To meet this criterion but preserve diversity in the port size and individual 
organizational role, the respondent pool was limited to ports along the West Coast of the 
continental United States. Of the 35 AMSCs in the United States, five fall within the self-
imposed geographic boundaries of the West Coast. From these five COTP zones, 24 
maritime homeland security professionals were recruited to participate in the survey. Of 
those, 27 percent of survey respondents self-identified as working at small port facilities, 
27 percent self-identified as medium port facilities, and 45 percent identified as large port 
facilities. It would have been desirable to have an even distribution from each size of port 
complex. Despite efforts to recruit representationally across port facility size and role in 
the homeland security enterprise (e.g., private sector or security sector), the distribution of 
participants favored the larger port complexes.  
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Figure 1. Coast Guard Captain of the Port/AMSC Zones128 
B. SURVEY RESPONSES, FINDINGS, AND ANALYSIS 
Eight coding categories emerged from round one responses, which were then split 
into two groups. The first group of words was associated with the concepts of effectiveness 
such as communication, collaboration, and relationships. The second group of coded terms 
appeared frequently and were affiliated with measures of effectiveness as well, such as 
planning, participation, and geography. The purpose of the coding and categorizing was to 
“sort” the responses into issue-specific sets that could be analyzed individually and to 
observe patterns, themes, and areas of consensus or dissent. The second round of questions 
focused on those areas of consensus and divergence, in the latter case, for example, might 
mean asking for a comment on outlier or “extreme” responses from round one, such as “I 
would rate all AMSCs that we work with as marginal . . . and have almost left out 
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industry.”129 The purpose of following up on these issues was to confirm, correct, or 
reconcile contradictions in the responses and to explore causal factors, important variables, 
and possible solutions and improvements.  
Once responses were assigned to an issue category, they were further coded as 
either a strength, weakness, opportunity, or threat using the SWOT analysis. This was a 
simple way to break problems down and categorize them for internal strengths and 
weaknesses and external threats and opportunities. The SWOT model was chosen because 
the Delphi survey tends to yield qualitative data that can be difficult to prioritize or 
operationalize. Therefore, by applying the coded data to these categories, the information 
is turned into actionable information in a familiar strategic analytical model. As relevant 
answers were placed in SWOT categories, patterns began to emerge (see Table 1). Several 
of the coded terms appeared in more than one SWOT quadrant. The reason was that they 
could be considered both a weakness and a threat, or an opportunity and a threat, to the 
effectiveness of AMSCs and the security of the maritime domain.  
Table 1. Survey Data Coded by Theme and SWOT 
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1. Strengths  
These are considered the “positive attributes, tangible and intangible internal to 
your organization.”130 Examples of strengths might be internal resources, assets, and 
intangible advantages such as staff or technical skills.131 As noted in Table 1, the key 
strengths that emerged in the answers were collaboration, effectiveness, and information 
sharing. The majority of participants had a positive opinion of the AMSC for their COTP 
zone, with 70 percent reporting a favorable view; 20 percent were neutral, and only 10 
percent were dissatisfied with the performance of AMSCs.132 The dissatisfaction with the 
committees is centered on the perceived composition because the majority of members 
came from security services, such as police and fire, and there was a lack of industry 
representation.133 In the second round survey, clarification was sought on this point, with 
70 percent of respondents stating that private-sector engagement was very important and 
the remaining 30 percent recognizing the importance but preferring balance across all 
stakeholders.134 Thus, when evaluating the original 10 percent who were dissatisfied, in 
subsequent queries, 100 percent of respondents felt that private-sector engagement was 
very important, or important. When asked the purpose of AMSCs, 91 percent of 
respondents referenced information sharing or collaboration as key functions of these 
committees.135 This high figure indicates a strong acknowledgment of the requirement to 
share law enforcement or threat intelligence across the MHS community.136 However, 
acknowledging the requirement does not constitute actual completion or effectiveness but 
does help to shape the personal behavior and effort of those involved.  
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Findings from the two surveys are substantiated in the 2016 and 2017 annual reports 
for AMSCs.137 These two documents cite numerous best practices employed by AMSCs 
to address the threats outlined in Chapter II of this thesis and highlight the strengths of 
collaboration and information sharing identified above. The overarching theme of these 
best practices in the reports is the value of the whole-of-government and private-sector 
approach to solving multi-agency and jurisdictional homeland security problems. While 
surveys and reports indicate positive findings, the Coast Guard has not applied any formal 
performance measures to gauge the level of collaboration or effectiveness.  
2. Weaknesses  
According to the literature, weaknesses are (usually internal) factors that reduce the 
effectiveness or value of an organization.138 In this case, geography, personnel turnover, 
bureaucracy, and finances are all examples of noted deficiencies in AMSCs.139 Geography 
refers to the distance people are required to travel to attend meetings or exercises. Having 
35 AMSCs to cover the entire United States coastline yields a ratio of approximately 10 
ports to every one AMSC to oversee. In the 2017 annual report, 10 out of 35 Sectors 
identified geography as impacting their organizational effectiveness.140 An example of this 
is a comment made in the first round of surveys: “Generating and maintaining participation 
from maritime stakeholders outside of the major port areas remains an ongoing challenge 
due to travel and meeting venue funding constraints.”141 The first round survey asked about 
the disadvantages or challenges with participation in the AMSC.142 Without specific 
prompting or initially targeting this issue, 45 percent of respondents mentioned geography 
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or travel time as barriers to participation.143 This issue was referenced in the second round 
of surveys to validate the first round and gather feedback for improvement.144 In the second 
round, 50 percent of respondents agreed that the time and distance between meeting 
locations was a significant challenge.145 The cost and consequence of geography is the time 
and effort required to travel to attend the meetings and participate on sub-committees. In 
order to overcome the burden of travel time, 50 percent of participants suggested the use 
of virtual meeting tools such as calling-in, email communications, or diversified meeting 
locations.146 These are useful, but with 45–50 percent of respondents describing this as an 
issue, it seems unlikely that electronic communications alone will overcome geographic 
distance. Personal connection and human interactions are vital to collaboration and the 
networked connection that makes the homeland security enterprise strong.  
There are three ways to address the challenge of distance between port facilities 
and AMSCs. The first option is to fund the travel of the outlying port partners. This would 
certainly incentivize their participation in the meetings and sub-committees. The second is 
to relocate the meetings to outlying port facilities and, again, to fund the travel of those 
agencies that are willing to attend. The third way to overcome the geographic distance is 
to enhance the virtual meeting tools such as video conferencing. When evaluating these 
three choices, the most expensive options are also likely to yield the best results; however, 
it is foreseeable that a combination of all three options would be needed.  
The first round yielded three comments that discussed the challenges of government 
bureaucracy. The first two comments were related to routine turnover of Coast Guard 
personnel.147 One participant responded, “The challenges of the AMSC are most apparent 
in the turnover of USCG personnel every 3–4 years (sometimes sooner). The structure can 
be rigid and at times confusing to those unfamiliar with the Coast Guard.”148 Another 
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participant noted, “Change[s] in local USCG personnel every couple years. Since our port 
is 275 miles north of our AMSC, we deal with our local USCG who in turn discusses issues 
with the AMSC.”149 As a leadership development tool, the Coast Guard rotates its officers 
every two or three years to different operational and staff assignments. This creates a 
system of constant re-learning and cross-training of the leadership cadre for AMSCs. These 
professional assignment rotations are highly beneficial for the individual leader working 
within an international organization. The problem is that every new person who rotates into 
the AMSC must become familiarized with the key players and re-establish the networked 
connections and relationships that make the committees effective. The Coast Guard has 
taken active measures to mitigate these transitions by hiring civilian port security 
specialists who provide some semblance of continuity. Unfortunately, the fact remains 
there is a lot of intentional turnover at senior levels within the Coast Guard, and this has a 
negative impact outside the organization.  
The third comment on bureaucracy was targeted at senior AMSC leaders: 
The effectiveness of the AMSC is limited by the bureaucracy. These 
agencies are supposed to work together as part of their jobs . . . and 
protecting the public and marine industry. Now when Police chiefs and Fire 
Chiefs and other senior officials come, the level of decorum is extremely 
high and becomes just another public meeting. The vast majority of 
“presentations” go to patting each other on the back for some small effort 
made to accommodate a past issue.150  
There are two ways to read this statement. The statement could mean there is much 
camaraderie but little in the way of taking on some of the tougher security challenges facing 
the maritime industry.151 It could also mean that because this is a public forum, it becomes 
more about social and political value rather than productivity. Throughout the first round 
of surveys, this same individual generally took a critical view of AMSCs and their 
engagement with the private sector.152 One of the answers provided in the first round of 
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surveys was used in the second round to gather more feedback on the role of private 
industry in AMSCs.153 Despite the connotation from the quote above, this comment largely 
stood alone: 90 percent of survey participants stated that industry engagement on AMSCs 
was a key component to their success, and no other participants made comments along 
these lines.154  
The last significant weakness that was not documented in the survey but was 
captured in the annual reports for AMSCs was the lack of financing. AMSCs operate on a 
minimal annual budget that is used for administrative costs such as office supplies. While 
the laws surrounding AMSCs allow for members to be compensated for their time, travel, 
and training at the GS-15 pay scale, the Coast Guard has prohibited the use of headquarters 
funding for AMSC members.155 The policy does allow local Coast Guard commands to 
pay for the travel of AMSC members out of their own unit funds. However, it is unlikely 
Sector commanders would use their budgets to pay for the travel of private industry 
personnel, when higher operational funding priorities exist. Thus, this ruling and 
subsequent funding posture by the Coast Guard creates a disincentive for participation from 
remote locations or for any other training or networking opportunities. The lack of funding 
also has a direct impact on the engagement of outlying port facilities as previously noted. 
If AMSC staff could fund the travel of participating executive committee members or 
remote sub-committee members, there would be a likely uptick in engagement across the 
Captain of the Port Zones. Another incentive is to provide a systematic method of on-
boarding new AMSC members across the country. As one participant responded, “The 
structure can be rigid and at times confusing to those unfamiliar with the Coast Guard—
perhaps a familiarization training/class for new members?”156 This course would enhance 
the members’ understanding of the organization, the history, and legislative requirements, 
thereby improving organizational performance.  
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In summary, AMSCs continue to add significant value to the MHS enterprise. 
However, that does not mean there is no room for organizational improvement. The Delphi 
panelists identified several weaknesses that the Coast Guard can address to enhance 
organizational performance and some that are unlikely to change, such as the senior officer 
assignment process. The Coast Guard has internally restricted the funding for travel and 
training of AMSC members. It is recommended that this policy be reevaluated to determine 
the true impact of that decision on organizational behavior and incentivizing participation.  
3. Opportunities  
In the business environment, opportunities are viewed largely as external options 
that are “reasons your business is likely to prosper” or things an organization can capitalize 
on for profit.157 In the case of AMSCs, the Delphi panelists identified internal 
opportunities, i.e., people or resources that could be capitalized on for the betterment of the 
group or the security of the COTP zone. Opportunities emerged in the form of criticism of 
areas that can be targeted for improved organizational performance. The three 
opportunities identified in the coded data include information sharing, communications, 
and participation levels.  
AMSCs are, by design, collaborative enterprises, dependent on the collective effort 
of voluntary members for success. A critical component of that collaboration is information 
sharing between stakeholder agencies and homeland security professionals.158 Because of 
the importance of information sharing and communications, the need to constantly stress 
this in the operational environment cannot be overstated. The majority of AMSC members 
are highly connected and networked individuals. Their sphere of influence and 
information-sharing capacity is broad; for these reasons, AMSCs present an excellent 
communications venue when properly managed. In the first round survey, 81 percent of 
respondents discussed some form of collaboration on homeland security issues as a key 
purpose of these bodies.159 While awareness and action are two separate principles, the 
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acknowledgment of the need to communicate and collaborate by the vast majority of survey 
participants is an indicator of their willingness to engage with fellow HLS professionals. 
Directly linked to this network and the information-sharing piece is the opportunity to 
enhance participation in AMSCs.  
In all voluntary organizations, participation and leadership are essential in keeping 
the members engaged. AMSCs have identified this issue as well; in 2016, nine out of the 
35 AMSCs, or approximately 25 percent, reported issues with participation from various 
groups.160 As one member put it, “We need to incentivize private sector participation better. 
We have done outreach to industry and requested their participation on the AMSC, but 
their attendance/participation remains low. This is despite topics which should be of 
interest to them.”161 This comment touches on the other factors of value and incentives. 
AMSCs are an excellent communication and outreach tool, and incentivizing the ideally 
networked/connected candidates can act as the force multiplier these committees were 
intended to be. Along this line, one of the survey participants stated, “Topics need to have 
a direct correlation to their facility/segment of the maritime domain to justify 
attendance.”162 This is statement seems to portray a circular logic loop in that the agenda 
and content of the meetings can drive or suppress participation and thereby increase or 
decrease effectiveness.163 To address this challenge, AMSCs must show relevance to their 
members and the constituents of the maritime homeland security environment. One idea 
presented in the second round of surveys was routine briefings on the who, what, when, 
where, why, and how of AMSCs and their role in the MHS construct.164 This is certainly 
one possible course of action. True organizational improvement likely involves a 
combination of professional, personal, and—to some extent—financial incentives such as 
more access to grant funding. 
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Within the homeland security environment, the concept and design of the AMSC 
are somewhat rare because of the intentional recruitment of different members of the MHS 
community. There are other public–private partnerships in the HLS enterprise; some are 
similar to AMSCs, such as the Transportation Security Administration’s Aviation Security 
Committee, and others serve as private-sector intelligence collection and distribution 
points—like ISACs. Nevertheless, neither of these is regional or local in nature but rather 
national-level organizations working across broad industries. The AMSCs’ unique 
composition offers an opportunity to work collectively on known threats and hazards to 
the HLS enterprise on a regional and local level through information sharing and 
collaboration. It is incumbent upon the leaders of these committees to focus on how they 
can leverage these two factors to enhance participation and engagement, capitalizing on 
the strengths to address significant threats or known weaknesses to the MHS enterprise.  
4. Threats 
These are generally considered external factors beyond the organization’s control. 
However, one can take preventive measures to minimize the exposure to threats—in this 
context, anything that can result in a transportation security incident or externally influence 
the behavior or effectiveness of AMSCs. The Delphi surveys identified three significant 
threats to effectiveness: participation, collaboration, and geography. Again, the three issues 
are largely interlinked and greatly influence the effectiveness of AMSCs in planning for, 
communicating about, and responding to a transportation security incident (TSI).165 The 
key to the success of AMSCs is active participation across a broad spectrum of business, 
labor, government, and security sectors. In the discussion on opportunities, the concept of 
participation was presented as a value-added proposition, but in this case, a lack of 
participation presents a significant threat to the HLS environment. The survey responses 
yielded three themes associated with the challenges of participation: a general lack of 
interest, a lack of collaboration by government agencies and industry, and a perceived lack 
of engagement by the Coast Guard. The general lack of interest was discussed in the 
opportunities section of this chapter; this section focuses on collaboration and leadership.  
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Responses in the first round highlighted both the lack of industry engagement and 
the involvement of other federal agencies.166 These were used for a follow-up question in 
the second round survey. The feedback on federal engagement was largely neutral, with 60 
percent of participants agreeing to some extent with the statement “I question the 
collaboration from other federal partners both working with the Coast Guard and other 
federal agencies, and collaborating with state/local agencies.”167 Twenty percent of 
participants reported that agency mission priorities and AMSC goals are misaligned.168 
When asked what to do to improve collaboration, one respondent cynically suggested, 
“Need another ‘9/11’ or another event that will refocus attention with presidential guidance 
to get all agencies on the same page.”169 A devastating attack would certainly focus the 
efforts of the first-responder community and increase collaboration across all federal 
agencies. However, the purpose of AMSCs is to prevent such an event from occurring, and 
leaders within the HLS and maritime industries should take every opportunity to work 
toward that end.  
The second issue with collaboration is tied to the Coast Guard’s role in facilitating 
a positive and engaged relationship with the maritime community. Two respondents 
highlighted challenges with geography and individual experience, respectively. When 
questioned on ways to improve outreach to more remote port facilities, one participant 
stated, “I also tend to believe that certain ports in a COTP Sector are more in reach and in 
common with the COTP and therefore garner the required attention that outlying ports need 
and want. This comes into play when PSGP funds are on the line.”170 Another survey 
participant responded that his agency had tried to engage with the Coast Guard but was 
unsuccessful in their effort to build a stronger relationship.171 Unfortunately, such 
responses provided little context from which to propose a solution. Although only 10 
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percent of participants made these comments, it is important to acknowledge their feedback 
and take active measures to engage with those disaffected parties.  
The last significant threat to the effectiveness of AMSCs is the challenge of 
geography. This topic has been discussed in other sections of this thesis. The vastness of 
the U.S. maritime borders and coastline creates significant challenges for maritime domain 
awareness and the enforcement of U.S. laws. Likewise, the geographic remoteness of many 
of the port facilities presents a vulnerability to U.S. border controls and a lack of 
government resources to respond in the event of an emergency. The consequence of a TSI 
at a remote facility may be less significant from an economic standpoint than an incident 
in a large urban area. However, because of the distance and time it may take to respond, 
the outcome of any event would likely grow to its greatest potential because of the delay 
in a full-scale response.  
The threats to the effectiveness of AMSCs include failures of participation and 
collaboration and the challenge of geography. The first two issues are interlinked in that an 
organization cannot be highly collaborative without active participation from its 
membership. The Coast Guard needs to take a more proactive role in incentivizing 
participation whether it be through grant funding, paying for individual AMSC member 
travel, or funding training opportunities. Additionally, a small number of survey 
participants noted a lack of external engagement from the Coast Guard proper; AMSC 
leadership must seek such feedback, address it quickly to ensure all participants feel 
acknowledged, and seize opportunities. AMSCs have a vital role in the maritime domain, 
but they need to be responsive and flexible and demonstrate value to remain relevant.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This project was initiated to enhance the understanding of the modern threat to the 
maritime homeland security environment and to evaluate how effective AMSCs have been 
at addressing those threats. To achieve this end, a two-round Delphi survey was conducted 
to evaluate AMSCs and to determine their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats. These themes were validated against the 2016 and 2017 annual reports for AMSCs. 
The key limiting factor was the survey size and level of participation. Round one of the 
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survey was completed and returned by 11 respondents—round two, by 10. This is an 
adequate number to meet the standards of Delphi survey validity, but a broader perspective 
would have added depth to the content and feedback.172  
The information from the surveys and the annual reports suggests that AMSCs are 
having a positive impact on the MHS environment. The key strength of AMSCs is their 
network of maritime professionals who can validate and provide immediate feedback on 
response plans and operations. Additionally, the individuals who are recruited for 
participation on AMSCs typically have substantial authority over personnel and resources. 
This networked system of empowered people is the strength behind the homeland security 
enterprise. The weaknesses that were identified include geography, bureaucracy, and 
personnel turnover. The opportunities include the ability to improve information sharing 
and garner greater participation across the MHS enterprise. Lastly, the threats to the 
AMSCs’ performance and effectiveness are the issues of participation, collaboration, and 
geography. In summary, AMSCs must leverage their networks to improve and engage with 
all of the maritime community, or they will quickly become irrelevant.  
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IV. ADOPTING A COLLABORATION MODEL 
The maritime domain is a complex system of users with a broad spectrum of 
individual interests. The homeland security enterprise is similar to a variety of regulatory 
and enforcement agencies, all with overlapping authorities, jurisdictions, and resources. To 
respond to the myriad of threats to the maritime community, the HLS system has become 
highly reliant on collaboration between the various stakeholders. In recognition of this 
integrated response among the government, labor, and the private sector, the Coast Guard 
has implemented regional security committees. Very little academic or government 
research has been conducted on how well these public–private partnerships have performed 
in achieving their mandates. The purpose of this research was to identify the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of AMSCs to begin to benchmark the level and 
quality of collaboration and performance and to suggest measures to improve both.  
Because of the complexity of the maritime homeland security environment, 
integrated response planning is essential, and the cost of failing to collaborate effectively 
could be catastrophic. Therefore, AMSC leadership must recognize the importance of 
deliberate collaboration to achieve specific goals within the MHS enterprise. Effective 
collaboration does not happen automatically, nor as a result of ad hoc effort. It is complex 
and must be undertaken in a systematic, informed, and dedicated way. The literature on 
collaboration is vast: theories, principles, studies, and best practices abound. There are 
many collaboration models, each with its own variations, but they mostly share the same 
basic structure and purpose. The inter-organizational collaboration capacity (ICC) model 
was selected because of its simplicity and clarity and because it employs the domains and 
factors most relevant and applicable to AMSCs.173 This chapter introduces the ICC model, 
applies it to the AMSC. 
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A. CAPITALIZING ON STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
In the previous chapter of this thesis coded data was applied to a SWOT model, an 
effective and simple tool to evaluate organizations. The challenge with SWOT is in 
operationalizing the findings. When looking at the attributes of AMSCs, the ICC Model is 
applicable because of the interdependent evolution of the maritime security system in the 
United States.174 ICC is “the capability of organizations (or a set of organizations) to enter 
into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective 
outcomes.”175 To do this, the ICC Model employs five domains, each with a series of sub-
factors that organizations should apply when conducting interagency operations (see 
Figure 2).176  
 
Figure 2. Organizational Factors in Successful Collaboration177 
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Because of the inherent complexity of the maritime environment, no single agency 
can solve the myriad of TSIs that might occur. Thus, AMSCs must advertise and advocate 
for their purpose and strategies. In this case, the collective outcome for AMSCs is to 
prevent, respond to, and mitigate the full spectrum of law enforcement and environmental 
incidents that might occur on federal waters. In the more robust and sophisticated port 
complexes, the potential economic impact or loss of life from a TSI can inspire the need 
for collaboration. Regardless of the motivation, when staffed and supported correctly, 
AMSCs create a positive network of first responders.178 With regard to the private sector, 
there are several instances in which the annual reports and the surveys both indicate that 
better outreach is needed to improve industry engagement and participation. Where the 
barriers to effectiveness exist, there are “divergent goals” or mission priorities within those 
agencies and businesses.179 Although not explicitly proven, several survey participants 
identified divergent goals as a barrier to better collaboration with both the maritime 
industry and unnamed federal agencies.180 A simple example of this is when the private 
sector may be reluctant to expend funds on anything not required by regulation whereas 
the first-responder community is much more inclined to take an all-hazards approach to 
HLS capabilities.  
The strategic actions required for effective inter-organizational collaboration 
include “demonstrated senior leadership commitment, and the willingness to consider other 
organizations’ interests in planning.”181 While the Coast Guard is heavily invested in the 
AMSC construct, others do not have this level of obligation. Two survey participants 
provided relevant examples of how strategic actions can and have enhanced participation. 
In one AMSC, the chief of police is the co-chair of the AMSC, and “this role gives 
continuity of committee leadership and visibility within the AMSC for [the] agency.”182 
By appointing this person to a key leadership role on the AMSC, the entire agency has a 
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vested interest in the security of the maritime domain surrounding this city. Another 
participant suggested appointing maritime industry partners to AMSCs. Provided the 
appointee is willing, this selected participation has the potential to be a positive means of 
outreach and engagement. These types of appointment benefit the AMSC by networking 
the organization’s leaders and exposing them to response plans and exercises. This 
exposure and experience stays with leaders and further strengthens the HLS network.  
1. Recommendation for Purpose and Strategy 
Although the purpose and strategy are well understood by those within the Coast 
Guard and affiliated with AMSCs, this may not be the case for others within the MHS 
community. Several responses in the surveys and in the annual reports identified issues 
with participation and a lack of collaboration with the private sector and other federal 
agencies. In order to improve, the Government Accountability Office outlined eight 
elements that greatly enhance the effectiveness of intergovernmental operations.183 Two of 
the eight guidelines can be applied in this instance to ensure a collective effort: “define and 
articulate a common outcome” and “identify and address needs by leveraging 
resources.”184 These directly correlate with the comment of one respondent: “Regular 
meetings, presentations on WWWWH [presumably this means who, what, when, why, 
how] their business impacts the maritime environment, commerce, safety and security.”185 
Therefore, AMSCs need to identify their value proposition, translate it into goals and 
objectives, and provide a clear understanding of shared responsibility for success.  
The second domain of the ICC model is structural flexibility.186 There are four sub-
factors to this domain, all of which have relevance to the success of AMSCs. The first 
factor is collaboration structures, which “can include liaison roles, participation in 
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interagency teams and task forces.” 187 AMSCs already leverage these structures to 
advance the MHS environment, for example, by using sub-committees for a myriad of 
organizational tasks such as tactical law enforcement responses. Some ports have used sub-
committees to represent remote port facilities although this practice is not widely done, nor 
has it been met with universal success.188 To address the threats posed by the geographic 
distance between AMSCs and outlying ports, there should be some consideration given to 
setting up sub-committees in remote areas where commuting to the AMSC meetings 
creates an undue burden. This provides access to the larger AMSC and advertises needed 
support from the Coast Guard for emergency planning. As noted previously, this is not a 
panacea but rather an option, and further research is warranted to truly correct this issue.  
The second factor in this domain is metrics.189 The Coast Guard and AMSCs are 
required to conduct approximately eight specific activities. The challenge with evaluating 
the performance or effectiveness of AMSCs is that no external performance metrics 
demonstrate how well they have executed their responsibilities or how well they have 
planned for the threats outlined in Chapter II. The act of collecting and reporting 
performance data further strains an under-resourced government committee. Additionally, 
establishing a report card is likely to be met with resistance. However, a clear evaluation 
system against known threats and requirements would undoubtedly increase performance.  
2. Recommendation for Structural Flexibility 
The structure of AMSCs is highly flexible depending on regional needs and the 
varying subcommittees that the FMSC elects to establish. This is generally a good thing 
because no one-size-fits-all model will work due to variances in geography, maritime 
traffic, and port size, to name a few. However, it is clear from the reports and surveys that 
31 percent of AMSCs have a problem with the geographic span of control.190 AMSC 
leadership must figure out a way to fund, incentivize, and build remote participation.  
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Second, the Coast Guard should establish a formal system of evaluation metrics 
linked to local, national, and international safety and security threats. This finding is 
supported by two recommendations in the Government Accountability Office’s report, to 
“develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; [and] reinforce agency 
accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.”191 Yearly, each 
COTP conducts a risk assessment of one’s zone and provides that information in an 
SSI/FOUO format to the chain of command. However, because of the access constraints 
associated with such classification of these documents, it is organizationally unclear how 
these metrics are benchmarked against known threats to the MTS and what is being done 
about them. The UN has identified several collective issues relating to the security of the 
oceans and seas. The closest thing to this overall assessment in the United States is the 
annual report for AMSCs with 35 individual parties describing their challenges, 
suggestions, accomplishments, and best practices.192 The annual reports indicate common 
trends and actions that the committees are taking on their own initiative. However, what is 
not shown or measured is the action vis-à-vis the threat environment. The Maritime 
Security Risk Assessment Model should provide some of this data. Because of the security 
classification of this system and the accompanying threat information, there is no 
transparency across the port infrastructure community or trend analysis that local and 
national users are applying operationally.  
The second challenge with metrics is that little in the way of consolidated worklists 
or prioritization of projects are being generated from the annual reports. These documents 
provide hundreds of challenges, best practices, and accomplishments across the spectrum 
of MHS threats and operations yet no consolidated plan. Therefore, this thesis recommends 
developing a metrics system that measures AMSC performance against stated performance 
requirements per the various legislative actions and known security threats to the MTS. 
From these metrics, a prioritized work plan could be developed at the regional and national 
levels.  
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The third domain of the ICC model is the incentives and rewards system.193 This 
refers to the tangible or intangible value that personnel or agencies experience from 
participating in collaborative groups.194 In the case of AMSCs, there are several examples 
of benefits from organizational participation, such as networking or the opportunity to lead 
local committees. However, the Coast Guard has failed to capitalize on the value of money 
and opportunity. The Coast Guard has unilaterally imposed the restriction not to pay 
AMSC members nor fund their travel or training.195 This policy is rather short-sighted and 
implies that people should be intrinsically patriotic to serve on these committees and 
receive no professional reward. The rule also discourages travel for participants from 
outlying ports to visit their parent AMSCs. The intention of this restriction seems to be to 
avoid the appearance of government-funded boondoggles for people in the private sector.  
3. Recommendation for Incentives and Rewards 
AMSCs are not adequately funded and resourced for their mission. The Coast 
Guard is authorized to pay AMSC members at the GS-15 level for travel and training.196 
However, the organization has chosen to prohibit the expenditure of funds in this 
manner.197 While government personnel can generally travel to outlying port facilities and 
file travel claims, private-sector members of the AMSC cannot. Nor can outlying partner 
organizations be funded for travel to participate in events that occur at the primary location 
of the AMSC meetings. This prohibition is obstructionist and limits organizational 
effectiveness when developing response plans and exercises. Therefore, it is recommended 
that the Coast Guard remove this prohibition and allocate a dedicated funding stream to 
each Captain of the Port for travel and training of AMSC members. This fund would be 
administered by the FMSC. As these are senior Coast Guard officers with oversight of 
million-dollar budgets, there is a low probability of waste, fraud, or abuse. Additional 
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funding for training and exercise coordination should also be provided. Survey respondents 
discussed the management of the Port Security Grant Funding; though the PSGP was not 
within the scope of this thesis, significant concerns were raised in AMSC documents across 
the nation on how this program is administered. If done correctly, the PSGP could be used 
as a strong participatory incentive across the MHS environment.  
The fourth domain is lateral mechanisms. These are both “the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
aspects of lateral coordination” with four sub-parts that are all relevant to AMSCs.198 The 
first element is social capital, the trust factor between participants that must exist for 
successful collaboration.199 The power of social networks emerged clearly in the survey 
responses as a value-added proposition of these committees: “The purpose is to effectively 
collaborate with federal, state, local and the private sector in San Diego. Sharing 
opportunities, ideas, and innovation in our area better helps us protect our own area from 
wrong doers.”200 This comment represents the optimal state of communications among 
AMSC members and the MHS community, which leads to the second factor of information 
Sharing; 81 percent of the survey respondents in the first round identified this as a key 
benefit of participation on the committees and rated their level of collaboration as above 
average or high.201 This principle was a clearly identified strength of AMSCs.  
The two factors for which AMSCs have both sought improvement and 
improvement is needed are the use of collaborative tools and opportunities for collaborative 
learning.202 These are technical systems such as data or communications systems that 
facilitate interagency effectiveness.203 Several local committees reported issues with 
interagency communications while others continue to perform exercises and drills to 
enhance interoperability and establish a common operating picture among first-responder 
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agencies.204 These are beneficial activities that undoubtedly yield positive results. 
However, the challenge of interagency communication continues across the MHS 
enterprise.  
4. Recommendation for Lateral Mechanisms 
With regard to collaborative learning, the committees are performing interagency 
drills and exercises, but no formal recruiting or indoctrination process exists for new 
participants in AMSCs. Although problematic, this also presents an opportunity. Those 
within the Coast Guard generally understand the purpose of AMSCs, but external partners 
may not. As recommended previously, ensuring total visibility of the essential functions of 
AMSCs to stakeholders and the maritime community has the potential to yield increased 
participation and relevance.  
The final domain of the ICC model is people—simply put, the ability to work well 
with others.205 As with all organizations, having high-performing people who are engaged 
and have a stake in the outcome of the operation is the key to success. AMSCs are a people-
driven enterprise, and as previously stated, this is the greatest strength of the committees.  
5. Recommendation for Individual Collaborative Capacities 
The strongest attribute of the AMSC is participation and collaboration from the 
security sector, maritime labor, and maritime industry. The Coast Guard and members of 
AMSCs should expand their outreach efforts to recruit and foster the participation of people 
who can make a difference within their discipline and the maritime environment. Every 
COTP and AMSC member must focus on the vision and long-term strategy of the 
organization to ensure relevance and the response capability.  
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B. UNREPORTED CHALLENGES 
1. Port Security Grant Program 
Several issues were reported by survey respondents as threats or issues that require 
greater engagement. The first of these concerns was the Port Security Grant Program. It 
appears from the most recent annual report that the PSGP is a key incentive for first 
responders and private industry alike, though plagued by a lack of feedback on grant 
submissions and concerns about the reduction in grant funding.206 This lack of information 
or transparency in the review process virtually eliminates any performance improvement 
or accountability within the grant administration system. This finding is supported in 
Captain Paul Arnett’s NPS Thesis in 2016 as well.207  
2. Cuts to Homeland Security Funding 
The second concern expressed by several AMSCs is the potential cut in homeland 
security grant funding, signaled in 2018 by the president’s proposed 52 percent reduction 
in funding for this program, which was ultimately rejected by Congress.208 The feedback 
is clear in the annual reports that the PSGP is an incentive tool that facilitates participation 
in AMSCs and the MHS enterprise. Although not a perfect program, this should continue 
to be supported and funded at the highest levels.  
3. Port Security Specialists 
Staffing and tasking of port security specialists and associated support staff are 
inadequate. In the 2017 annual report, approximately 15 AMSCs reported a variety of 
issues with the employment of port security specialists, position gaps, supporting position 
gaps, the elimination of positions, or the transfer of billets.209 Such issues create a 
sub-optimal performance environment for AMSCs. The factors varied among AMSCs, but 
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staffing and personnel management issues were widely reported as organizational 
challenges. With 42 percent of the committees reporting problems in this arena, the Coast 
Guard should conduct a holistic review to evaluate and prioritize the expectations for 
personnel filling roles that support AMSCs.  
4. Geography 
Geography is negatively impacting the effectiveness of AMSCs. This finding is 
based on comments in the surveys and the feedback in the 2016 and 2017 annual reports 
for AMSCs. As noted previously, the U.S. shoreline is over 10,000 miles long with 361 
maritime ports and 35 AMSCs to plan for any natural or man-made disasters. This creates 
a span of control of approximately 10 port facilities spread over 285 miles of coastline per 
each AMSC. This extended span of control creates barriers to communication, 
relationships, and network building. The Coast Guard has recognized this and attempted to 
mitigate the challenge of distance by establishing local sub-committees. However, based 
on mixed feedback in the annual reports, sub-committees can have challenges as well and 
are not necessarily a silver bullet to this problem. Nevertheless, this effort to establish sub-
committees should be aggressively pursued to ensure that these remote maritime 
enterprises are being represented and given access to the full benefits of their AMSCs. 
Several survey responses further suggested expanding participation into other areas such 
as video teleconferencing and the appointment of industry personnel to leadership roles on 
AMSCs. The Coast Guard and the COTP/FMSC must show a value to the key stakeholders 
and participants within their zones. Therefore, aggressive recruiting, training exercises, and 
outreach must be pursued well outside the primary location of the FMSC. For instance, 
members of AMSCs and port security specialists should host meetings in the farthest 
outlying ports to ensure they are networked into the facilities and security agencies within 
that local region.  
5. Cybersecurity 
Although touched on briefly as a known threat to the MTS, cybersecurity continues 
to be a significant challenge for both the public and private sector. The speed of 
technological development and a lack of threat awareness create a permissive environment 
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for criminal behavior. Recognizing this weakness, many AMSCs are actively working to 
build organizational knowledge and strengthen the MTS against the cyber threat. Despite 
these efforts, the Coast Guard has not provided the training and policy to counter this 
challenge.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is recommended that the Coast Guard undergo an evaluation of each AMSC. The 
surveys conducted for this project were deliberately narrow in focus; a broader series of 
surveys across each Coast Guard COTP, District, and Area would provide a much wider 
spectrum of feedback, wherein regional and national issues would likely be identified as 
organizational trends. The implementation of the ICC model using the priorities yielded in 
the SWOT analysis would allow this kind of comprehensive evaluation to include 
benchmarked and quantifiable data and metrics.  
The Coast Guard participates in other committees at the local, regional, and national 
levels, such as Harbor Safety Committees and ISACs. There is little research on what these 
organizations do and how effective they are in enhancing the safety and security of the 
nation and maritime community. The maritime security community would benefit from the 
kind of baseline inquiry and data collection conducted in this thesis.  
D. CONCLUSION 
With the rapid growth of maritime commerce, a complex system of overlapping 
authorities and jurisdictions have evolved to secure the world’s oceans and ships. Because 
of the expanded use of the seas, the concept of maritime security has evolved as well. This 
concept has largely focused on naval control of the oceans and sea lines of communication. 
To address this complex system of state and non-state actors, today’s maritime security 
includes the full scope of government, military and police operations, laws, and policies 
employed to facilitate the safety and security of the maritime domain. Applying these 
principles after the attacks on 9/11, the U.S. government passed a series of laws and 
executive actions that mandated the creation of AMSCs, whose purpose is to use these 
public–private partnerships to address and minimize the threats to the MTS and the 
maritime domain.  
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This thesis was meant to be a first step in identifying the overall value and 
effectiveness of AMSCs; their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats; and their 
role in protecting the maritime transportation system, particularly as it relates to 
collaboration. There was little reason to suspect at the outset of this thesis that AMSCs are 
not a reasonably effective collaboration mechanism. Equally, there were no data or 
processes by which to know this with certainty and in detail. Nor any formal and robust 
collaboration best practices in place to guide and enable optimal performance. Likewise, 
the Delphi responses confirmed many readily predictable issues, such as the disadvantage 
of distance from the physical location of the AMSC, rather than revealed mysterious or 
surprising ones. Still, the process of building a measurably effective and universally 
valuable collaboration is one of stages, the first of which was the purpose of this research 
and the next of which should be undertaken by the Coast Guard itself.   
Key recommendations for the organizational improvement of AMSCs include 
increasing funding, modifying funding rules to allow AMSCs to pay for travel and training 
of non–Coast Guard members, developing a standard method to train new AMSC 
personnel, and developing performance metrics tied to known threats and operational 
requirements. Additionally, at the national level, a prioritization of threat-based tasking 
should be established for regional and national oversight.  
Through the process of regular meetings and exercises, AMSCs are reinforcing 
positive network connections of MHS professionals from a variety of agencies and 
occupations. These interactions represent the true strength of the homeland security 
enterprise. The ability to build relationships and employ those connections to enhance the 
security of the nation is the true benefit of AMSCs.  
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APPENDIX A. ROUND ONE SURVEY DATA 
A. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
1. What is the purpose of the AMSC?  
2. How do you define or recognize “success” with regard to the AMSC?  
3. How would you rate the performance of the AMSC you belong to?  
4. What are the benefits to you or your organization for AMSC 
Participation?  
5. Are there disadvantages to or challenges with participation on the AMSC?  
6. How would you rate the quality of collaboration on your AMSC?  
7. What limits the effectiveness of the AMSC? 
8. What is the size of your port facility: Small, Medium, Large. 
B. SURVEY ANSWERS  
Q.1. What is the purpose of the AMSC in your Captain of the Port Zone? 
A1.1. To facilitate communication between port interests. 
A1.2. The purpose is to effectively collaborate with federal, state, local and the 
private sector in San Diego. Sharing opportunities, ideas and innovation in 
our area better helps us protect our own area from wrong doers. 
A1.3. We work in multiple AMSC zones. The purpose of the AMSC is supposed 
to be improving maritime security in port areas. This would be general areas 
of the port, the movement of vessels into and departing the port, and 
integration of Facility Security Plans. 
A1.4. To bring stakeholders in the domain together to share, collaborate and be 
forward thinking and moving based on current events. Being a small port in 
the COTP zone containing large ports, we are able to glean information, get 
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exposure and attention as well as utilize lessons from others. We can 
network and get recognized for more than just incidents that a COTP 
normally would.  
A1.5. I do not have one COTP Zone, My position is at the Coast Guard Area Level 
which provides operational planning and policy guidance to the Districts 
and Sectors. Primarily the AMSC purpose is to provide advice in AMS 
assessments and planning for the port. Be a vital comms link for the COTP 
and the port partners. The AMSC is an advisory committee to the COTP 
A1.6. to serve a medium of communication and provide leadership in problem 
solving within the region. 
A1.7. To address maritime security issues that may arise. Review and update 
security plans for facilities, security zones and port closures. Assist facility 
owners with questions and concerns. 
A1.8. Bring together federal, state, local and industry maritime stakeholders to 
discuss and address issues of common interest in the maritime security 
realm. 
A1.9. To ensure effective government and private sector security measures are 
being coordinated in a manner that allows all responding entities to 
implement plans and procedures designed to deter, detect, disrupt, respond 
to, and recover from a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) or the threat 
thereof. 
A1.10. The AMSC is a mechanism of the Coast Guard's COTP to bring together 
federal, state, local, and private partners who have a stake or concern in 
maritime/port security. Through this committee, the functions of these 
various stakeholders are coordinated to promote executive level strategy 
and decision making, to enhance and promote port security, to disseminate 
information/intelligence, to coordinate training/exercises/drills/grants, and 
to collaborate during operations. 
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A1.11. The AMSC is a means for industry leaders to collaborate and share ideas in 
a symposium style format. It also acts as a sounding board for major issues 
facing operations and security. The committee helps create partnerships 
within the maritime community. 
Q2. How do you define or recognize "success" with regard to the AMSC? 
A2.1.  By having an impact on things that are important to my area of operations, 
and a general advancement of safety and security of my region. 
A2.2. Continuous collaboration, networking and participants effectively working 
together as a team for the common goal. 
A2.3. The means to define or recoginze success of the AMSC is to conduct a risk 
assessment and then to re-evaluate after changes have been made and 
implemented. This should not be done by assuming or guessing the impact. 
All AMSC's conducted risk assessments in the very beginning. These were 
conducted using USCG support. These risk assessments should be revisited 
to determine what security improvements have actually been made. 
A2.4. Success of an AMSC is a good turn out, active involvement and a good 
agenda. Bringing industry stakeholders and partners together to be 
productive and open about real threats, industry issues, concerns, incident 
review, etc. leads to focus and change or implementation of processes or 
regulations that can make for a safer domain. Small ports can benefit from 
the lessons learned of their bigger partners in the zone and gain/glean 
information and exposure with the COTP to aid in grants and overall 
support. 
A2.5. Proper, timely, information sharing. Jointly and successfully address port 
vulnerabilities. Identify and mitigate capabilities gaps. 
A2.6. when issues come up and the group discusses options and finds an effective 
response. 
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A2.7. Communication. We are able to communicate with local representatives 
24/7. 
A2.8. Conduct fruitful meetings, discussions and exercises which address 
maritime security issues and advance collective preparedness and 
cooperation for any potential event.  
A2.9. Holistic and inclusive engagement from all aspects of the maritime industry 
throughout the entire FMSC's AOR that shows an understanding of 
intermodal and interlinking threats that can impact our AOR. 
A2.10. The success of the AMSC should be measured both by the participation in 
the AMSC - do we have all relevant stakeholders represented? Do the 
represented stakeholders comprising the AMSC produce products that 
support and improve maritime security? For my port, the AMSC has been a 
good foundational mechanism for creating other operational and training 
components. Participants in the AMSC are also represented in the Regional 
Coordinating Mechanism (RECOM), Exercise Bay Shield (annual maritime 
security exercise program), Maritime Regional Rad/Nuc Detection Program 
and others. Each of the above listed successes collected the appropriate 
AMSC stakeholders and provided a product that enhanced maritime 
security for federal, state, local, and private entities.  
A2.11. Success is measured in the amount of incidences or lack thereof. The less 
you hear about maritime security the (arguably) more effective it is. 
Q3. How would you rate the performance of the AMSC you belong to? 
A3.1. Fair 
A3.2. I would rate the performance and collaboration to be outstanding. 
A3.3. I wouuld rate all AMSC's that we work with as marginal. AMSC's have 
become more political in nature and bureaucratic. They are comprised 
almost entirely of federal, state, and local agencies (police/fire) and have 
almost left out industry. 
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A3.4. I really rate the AMSC events near me as high. As already mentioned, we 
are able to glean/gain information and contact with the COTP and other big 
port domain stakeholders that otherwise we may never have. We also have 
implemented a local AMSC for just our area and invite those from the 
COTP zone to join in. it helps other ports see what a smaller port complex 
deals with on a much slimmer budget. 
A3.5. NA 
A3.6. Outstanding, the COPT has always provided clear communication and 
direction. 
A3.7. Above average. 
A3.8. Good. Regular meetings held, with good attendance. Exercises are 
objectives-oriented and well received by industry as well as other agencies. 
A3.9. Moderate. Needs more inclusion from remote ports and encouragement for 
participation. 
A3.10. Overall, if I were to give our AMSC a "letter grade," I would rate it as a B+. 
A3.11. I think the AMSC in the Port of SF is really strong. That having been said I 
firmly believe there is a large room for improvement based on the high level 
of exposure many ferry and transit operators. Greater training and 
collaborative sessions between the USCG and vessel operators would allow 
for unified and more predictable response to hazards, and emergencies.  
Q4. What are the benefits to you or your organization for AMSC participation? 
A4.1. A voice at the table. 
A4.2. To be kept up to date with our neighbors and collaborate in keeping our 
zones safe. 
A4.3. The benefits are to merely know the players and for them to be familiar with 
our organization. 
A4.4. exposure, lessons learned, communication and collaboration.  
64 
A4.5. Information sharing 
A4.6. problem solving, chance to communicate with regional stakeholders, share 
insights, situational awareness. 
A4.7. Keeping on top of current information. 
A4.8. Stakeholder input to DHS and other maritime security requirements and 
initiatives. Increased stakeholder buy-in to USCG and DHS security 
programs. 
A4.9. Better awareness of emerging threats and understanding of how they impact 
the entire AOR. 
A4.10. Our Chief of Police serves as the Co-Chair of the AMSC. This role gives 
continuity of committee leadership and visibility within the AMSC for our 
agency. 
A4.11. Peace of mind for our ridership, customers and employees knowing highly 
trained professionals and resources can be deployed at a moments notice. 
The backing of a firmly rooted and established training regimen helps also. 
Q5. Are there disadvantages to or challenges with participation on the AMSC? 
A5.1. Yes, the meetings are four and a half hours away.  
A5.2. N/A 
A5.3. The AMSC's do not appear to regard the marine industry inputs as they do 
their own self-needs. The AMSC's have become magnets for agencies 
wanting money to support individual desires. 
A5.4. Travel time, frequency and still being the outlier from the north. 
A5.5. N/A 
A5.6. At times travelling to the location for the meetings can be an issue 
depending on where the meeting is being held. But if we could 
teleconference it would help. 
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A5.7. Change in local USCG personnel every couple years. Since our port is 275 
miles north of our AMSC, we deal with our local USCG who in turn 
discusses issues with the AMSC. 
A5.8. Biggest challenge is geographic reach of the AOR and distance between 
ports. Most industry and largest ports are concentrated in the 
Portland/Vancouver area, and meetings here are well attended by local 
industry and agencies. However, other ports (Astoria, Pasco/tri-cities, Coos 
Bay, Grays Harbor) are between 2 and 4 hours away and cannot regularly 
attend meetings. Security concerns and cargo are also widely disparate 
between river and coastal ports, defeating most attempts at a "one size fits 
all" approach to addressing maritime issues. 
A5.9. yes. We have a large AOR with the concentration of industry in Portland, 
which oftentimes limits participation for outlying ports like Grays Harbor, 
Coos Bay, and the Tri-Cities area.  
A5.10. The challenges of the AMSC are most apparent in the turnover of USCG 
personnel every 3-4 years (sometimes sooner). The structure can be rigid 
and at times confusing to those unfamiliar with the Coast Guard - perhaps a 
familiarization training/class for new members? Some of the efforts of the 
AMSC can overlap with other non-Coast Guard, regional efforts. This can 
created conflicts and redundancies that need to be identified, considered and 
resolved. 
A5.11. No 
Q.6. How would you rate the quality of collaboration on your AMSC? 
A6.1. Typically the administrator is just a phone call away and always willing to 
listen. So, good. 
A6.2. Excellent - Ideal. 
A6.3. On a ten point scale, I would rate them all about a 4. 
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A6.4. high. i have seen offshoot groups and events spawn from AMSCs and have 
to think that the Rolodex created from the meetings can make for quick and 
active response. 
A6.5. N/A 
A6.6. Very high 
A6.7. Above average. 
A6.8. Good. 
A6.9. Moderate 
A6.10. The Coast Guard's collaboration with my agency and with regional partners 
has been very good. I question the collaboration from other federal partners 
both working with the Coast Guard and other federal agencies, and 
collaborating with state/local agencies.   
A6.11. It takes a lot of follow through but there is plenty of opportunity for new 
partnerships and the strengthening of existing relationships. 
Q7. What limits the effectiveness of the AMSC? 
A7.1. It is hard to push out goals and then follow up outcomes with so large of an 
AOR. Everyone who sits at the table is competing for limited resources. 
A7.2. N/A 
A7.3. The effectiveness of the AMSC is limited by the bureaucracy. These 
agencies are supposed to work together as part of their jobs and protecting 
the public and marine industry. Now when Police chiefs, Fire Chiefs and 
other senior officials come, the level of decorum is extremely high and 
becomes just another public meeting. The vast majority of "presentations" 
go to patting each other on the back for some small effort made to 
accommodate a past issue. 
A7.4. attendance and agenda. If there is a weak agenda it turns into a less valuable 
time spent with stakeholders. I think that if attandance is weak, a good 
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agenda suffers, and if agendas are weak, attandance suffers in relation. As 
long as they bring people together with goals and forums to work then they 
will always be valuable.  
A7.5. lack of participation and enthusiasm 
A7.6. really has no limits, meets it goals for communication 
A7.7. Again the change in local personnel. 
A7.8. Geography and the resulting limits on attendance, see above. 
A7.9. Geography. 
A7.10. The AMSC is only as strong as the participation, the information sharing, 
and support of the willing. As mentioned above, changes in USCG staff can 
limit, delay or reduce the effectiveness of the AMSC. 
A7.11. The operators' consistency in regards to follow through and policy 
enforcement. 
Q8. Please rank your estimated port size in relation to other maritime ports within the 
United States. 








A8.9. Medium  
A8.10. Medium 
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A8.11. Large  
C. SURVEY ANSWERS CODED BY THEME  
Effective 
• The purpose is to effectively collaborate 
• To ensure effective government and private sector security measures are being 
coordinated 
• participants effectively working together 
• group discusses options and finds an effective response. 
• The less you hear about maritime security the (arguably) more effective it is. 
effectiveness of the AMSC is limited by the bureaucracy 
changes in USCG staff can limit, delay or reduce the effectiveness of the AMSC. 
• Needs more inclusion from remote ports and encouragement for participation 
• The challenges of the AMSC are most apparent in the turnover of USCG personnel 
every 3-4 years (sometimes sooner). 
• The structure can be rigid and at times confusing to those unfamiliar with the Coast 
Guard - perhaps a familiarization training/class for new members? 
• Some of the efforts of the AMSC can overlap with other non-Coast Guard, regional 
efforts. This can created conflicts and redundancies that need to be identified, 
considered and resolved. 
• I question the collaboration from other federal partners both working with the Coast 
Guard and other federal agencies, and collaborating with state/local agencies. 
• If there is a weak agenda it turns into a less valuable time spent with stakeholders. 
I think that if attandance is weak, a good agenda suffers, and if agendas are weak, 
attandance suffers in relation. 
• Again the change in local personnel. 
Communication 
• To facilitate communication between port interests 
• to serve a medium of communication and provide leadership in problem solving 
within the region. 
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• Communication. We are able to communicate with local representatives 24/7. 
• really has no limits, meets it goals for communication 
• Stakeholder input to DHS and other maritime security requirements and initiatives 
• The structure can be rigid and at times confusing to those unfamiliar with the Coast 
Guard - perhaps a familiarization training/class for new members? 
• Some of the efforts of the AMSC can overlap with other non-Coast Guard, regional 
efforts. This can created conflicts and redundancies that need to be identified, 
considered and resolved. 
• The AMSC's do not appear to regard the marine industry inputs as they do their 
own self-needs. 
Collaborate 
• To bring stakeholders in the domain together to share, collaborate and be forward 
thinking and moving based on current events. 
• The purpose is to effectively collaborate with federal, state, local and the private 
sector 
• To bring stakeholders in the domain together to share, collaborate and be forward 
thinking and moving based on current events 
• to coordinate training/exercises/drills/grants, and to collaborate during operations. 
• The AMSC is a means for industry leaders to collaborate and share ideas in a 
symposium style format. 
• To be kept up to date with our neighbors and collaborate in keeping our zones safe. 
• Sharing opportunities, ideas and innovation in our area better helps us protect our 
own area from wrong doers. 
• Assist facility owners with questions and concerns. 
• Bring together federal, state, local and industry maritime stakeholders to discuss 
and address issues of common interest in the maritime security realm. 
• The AMSC is a mechanism of the Coast Guard's COTP to bring together federal, 
state, local, and private partners who have a stake or concern in maritime/port 
security. 
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• The committee helps create partnerships within the maritime community.  
• Jointly and successfully address port vulnerabilities. Identify and mitigate 
capabilities gaps. 
• The AMSC's do not appear to regard the marine industry inputs as they do their 
own self-needs. 
• The challenges of the AMSC are most apparent in the turnover of USCG personnel 
every 3-4 years (sometimes sooner). 
• The structure can be rigid and at times confusing to those unfamiliar with the Coast 
Guard - perhaps a familiarization training/class for new members? 
• Some of the efforts of the AMSC can overlap with other non-Coast Guard, regional 
efforts. This can created conflicts and redundancies that need to be identified, 
considered and resolved. 
• I question the collaboration from other federal partners both working with the Coast 
Guard and other federal agencies, and collaborating with state/local agencies. 
• Again the change in local personnel. 
Information 
• we are able to glean information, get exposure and attention as well as utilize 
lessons from others. 
• to disseminate information/intelligence, to coordinate 
training/exercises/drills/grants, and to collaborate during operations. 
• gain/glean information and exposure with the COTP to aid in grants and overall 
support. 
• Proper, timely, information sharing. 
• Proper and timely information sharing across the maritime domain. 
• As already mentioned, we are able to glean/gain information 
• Information sharing 
• Keeping on top of current information. 
• The AMSC is only as strong as the participation, the information sharing, and 
support of the willing 
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• Sharing opportunities, ideas and innovation in our area better helps us protect our 
own area from wrong doers. 
• Bring together federal, state, local and industry maritime stakeholders to discuss 
and address issues of common interest in the maritime security realm. 
• Better awareness of emerging threats and understanding of how they impact the 
entire AOR. 
Plan 
• the movement of vessels into and departing the port, and integration of Facility 
Security Plans. 
• provides operational planning and policy guidance to the Districts and Sectors. 
• Primarily the AMSC purpose is to provide advice in AMS assessments and 
planning for the port 
• implement plans and procedures designed to deter, detect, disrupt, respond to, and 
recover from a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) 
• Review and update security plans for facilities, security zones and port closures. 
Participation/Participate  
• networking and participants effectively working together 
• The success of the AMSC should be measured both by the participation 
• Participants in the AMSC are also represented in the Regional Coordinating 
Mechanism (RECOM) 
• Needs more inclusion from remote ports and encouragement for participation 
• We have a large AOR with the concentration of industry in Portland, which 
oftentimes limits participation for outlying ports like Grays Harbor, Coos Bay, and 
the Tri-Cities area. 
• lack of participation and enthusiasm 
• Success of an AMSC is a good turn out, active involvement and a good agenda. 
Bringing industry stakeholders and partners together to be productive and open 
about real threats, industry issues, concerns, incident review, etc. leads to focus and 
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change or implementation of processes or regulations that can make for a safer 
domain 
• Stakeholder input to DHS and other maritime security requirements and initiatives 
• Some of the efforts of the AMSC can overlap with other non-Coast Guard, regional 
efforts. This can created conflicts and redundancies that need to be identified, 
considered and resolved. 
Relationship  
• It takes a lot of follow through but there is plenty of opportunity for new 
partnerships and the strengthening of existing relationships. 
• We can network and get recognized for more than just incidents that a COTP 
normally would.  
• Bring together federal, state, local and industry maritime stakeholders to discuss 
and address issues of common interest in the maritime security realm. 
• The committee helps create partnerships within the maritime community.  
• At times travelling to the location for the meetings can be an issue depending on 
where the meeting is being held. 
• I question the collaboration from other federal partners both working with the Coast 
Guard and other federal agencies, and collaborating with state/local agencies. 
Geography 
• Geography and the resulting limits on attendance, see above. 
• Needs more inclusion from remote ports and encouragement for participation 
• Yes, the meetings are four and a half hours away. 
• Travel time, frequency and still being the outlier from the north. 
• Since our port is 275 miles north of our AMSC, we deal with our local USCG who 
in turn discusses issues with the AMSC. 
• We have a large AOR with the concentration of industry in Portland, which 
oftentimes limits participation 
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D. SURVEY ANSWERS CODED BY SWOT 
1. Strengths 
These are considered the “positive attributes, tangible and intangible internal to 
your organization.”210 Examples of strengths are internal resources, assets, advantages such 
as staff or technical skill, etc. Key terms: collaboration, effectiveness, planning, 
networking, relationships 
• The Coast Guard's collaboration with my agency and with regional partners has 
been very  
• good. I question the collaboration from other federal partners both working with 
the Coast Guard and other federal agencies, and collaborating with state/local 
agencies.    
• The purpose is to effectively collaborate with federal, state, local and the private 
sector in San Diego. Sharing opportunities, ideas and innovation in our area better 
helps us protect our own area from wrong doers. 
• To bring stakeholders in the domain together to share, collaborate and be forward 
thinking and moving based on current events. Being a small port in the COTP zone 
containing large ports, we are able to glean information, get exposure and attention 
as well as utilize lessons from others. We can network and get recognized for more 
than just incidents that a COTP normally would.  
• to serve a medium of communication and provide leadership in problem solving 
within the region. 
• Bring together federal, state, local and industry maritime stakeholders to discuss 
and address issues of common interest in the maritime security realm. 
• To ensure effective government and private sector security measures are being 
coordinated in a manner that allows all responding entities to implement plans and 
procedures designed to deter, detect, disrupt, respond to, and recover from a 
Transportation Security Incident (TSI) or the threat thereof. 
                                                 
210 Berry, “What Is a SWOT Analysis?”  
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• The AMSC is a means for industry leaders to collaborate and share ideas in a 
symposium style format. It also acts as a sounding board for major issues facing 
operations and security. The committee helps create partnerships within the 
maritime community. 
• Continuous collaboration, networking and participants effectively working together 
as a team for the common goal. 
2. Weaknesses  
These are things that reduce the effectiveness or value of an organization; these are 
usually internal factors.211 In this case, finances, geography, and leadership are all 
examples. Key terms: geography, personnel turnover, bureaucracy, participation  
• the meetings are four and a half hours away. 
• The AMSC's do not appear to regard the marine industry inputs as they do their 
own self-needs. The AMSC's have become magnets for agencies wanting money 
to support individual desires. 
• At times travelling to the location for the meetings can be an issue depending on 
where the meeting is being held. But if we could teleconference it would help. 
• Change in local USCG personnel every couple years. Since our port is 275 miles 
north of our AMSC, we deal with our local USCG who in turn discusses issues with 
the AMSC. 
• Biggest challenge is geographic reach of the AOR and distance between ports. Most 
industry and largest ports are concentrated in the Portland/Vancouver area, and 
meetings here are well attended by local industry and agencies. However, other 
ports (Astoria, Pasco/tri-cities, Coos Bay, Grays Harbor) are between 2 and 4 hours 
away and cannot regularly attend meetings. Security concerns and cargo are also 
widely disparate between river and coastal ports, defeating most attempts at a "one 
size fits all" approach to addressing maritime issues. 
                                                 
211 Berry. 
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• We have a large AOR with the concentration of industry in Portland, which 
oftentimes limits participation for outlying ports like Grays Harbor, Coos Bay, and 
the Tri-Cities area. 
• The challenges of the AMSC are most apparent in the turnover of USCG personnel 
every 3-4 years (sometimes sooner). The structure can be rigid and at times 
confusing to those unfamiliar with the Coast Guard - perhaps a familiarization 
training/class for new members? Some of the efforts of the AMSC can overlap with 
other non-Coast Guard, regional efforts. This can created conflicts and 
redundancies that need to be identified, considered and resolved. 
• The effectiveness of the AMSC is limited by the bureaucracy. These agencies are 
supposed to work together as part of their jobs and protecting the public and marine 
industry. Now when Police chiefs, Fire Chiefs and other senior officials come, the 
level of decorum is extremely high and becomes just another public meeting. The 
vast majority of "presentations" go to patting each other on the back for some small 
effort made to accommodate a past issue. 
• lack of participation and enthusiasm 
3. Opportunities 
In the business environment, opportunities are viewed largely as external options 
that are “reasons your business is likely to prosper” or things an organization can capitalize 
on for profit.212 In the case of AMSCs, several factors were internal opportunities, i.e., 
people or internal resources that could be capitalized on for the betterment of the group. 
Key terms: inputs, effectiveness, bureaucracy, information sharing, participation, 
communications  
• The AMSC's do not appear to regard the marine industry inputs as they do their 
own self-needs. The AMSC's have become magnets for agencies wanting money 
to support individual desires. 
                                                 
212 Berry. 
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• The effectiveness of the AMSC is limited by the bureaucracy. These agencies are 
supposed to work together as part of their jobs and protecting the public and marine 
industry. Now when Police chiefs, Fire Chiefs and other senior officials come, the 
level of decorum is extremely high and becomes just another public meeting. The 
vast majority of "presentations" go to patting each other on the back for some small 
effort made to accommodate a past issue. 
• attendance and agenda. If there is a weak agenda it turns into a less valuable time 
spent with stakeholders. I think that if attandance is weak, a good agenda suffers, 
and if agendas are weak, attandance suffers in relation. As long as they bring people 
together with goals and forums to work then they will always be valuable. 
• The AMSC is only as strong as the participation, the information sharing, and 
support of the willing. As mentioned above, changes in USCG staff can limit, delay 
or reduce the effectiveness of the AMSC. 
• Success of an AMSC is a good turn out, active involvement and a good agenda. 
Bringing industry stakeholders and partners together to be productive and open 
about real threats, industry issues, concerns, incident review, etc. leads to focus and 
change or implementation of processes or regulations that can make for a safer 
domain. Small ports can benefit from the lessons learned of their bigger partners in 
the zone and gain/glean information and exposure with the COTP to aid in grants 
and overall support. 
• Proper, timely, information sharing. Jointly and successfully address port 
vulnerabilities. Identify and mitigate capabilities gaps. 
• when issues come up and the group discusses options and finds an effective 
response. 
• Communication. We are able to communicate with local representatives 24/7. 
• The success of the AMSC should be measured both by the participation in the 
AMSC - do we have all relevant stakeholders represented? Do the represented 
stakeholders comprising the AMSC produce products that support and improve 
maritime security? For my port, the AMSC has been a good foundational 
mechanism for creating other operational and training components. Participants in 
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the AMSC are also represented in the Regional Coordinating Mechanism 
(RECOM), Exercise Bay Shield (annual maritime security exercise program), 
Maritime Regional Rad/Nuc Detection Program and others. Each of the above 
listed successes collected the appropriate AMSC stakeholders and provided a 
product that enhanced maritime security for federal, state, local, and private entities. 
4. Threats 
These are generally considered external factors beyond the organization’s control. 
However, one can take preventive measures to minimize the exposure to threats. Threats 
have been interpreted as anything that can lead up to a transportation security incident or 
externally influence the behavior or effectiveness of AMSCs. Key terms: participation, 
collaboration, geography 
• lack of participation and enthusiasm 
• I wouuld rate all AMSC's that we work with as marginal. AMSC's have become 
more political in nature and bureaucratic. They are comprised almost entirely of 
federal, state, and local agencies (police/fire) and have almost left out industry. 
• I firmly believe there is a large room for improvement based on the high level of 
exposure many ferry and transit operators. Greater training and collaborative 
sessions between the USCG and vessel operators would allow for unified and more 
predictable response to hazards, and emergencies. 
• Yes, the meetings are four and a half hours away. 
• Change in local USCG personnel every couple years. Since our port is 275 miles 
north of our AMSC, we deal with our local USCG who in turn discusses issues with 
the AMSC. 
• yes. We have a large AOR with the concentration of industry in Portland, which 
oftentimes limits participation for outlying ports like Grays Harbor, Coos Bay, and 
the Tri-Cities area. 
• The challenges of the AMSC are most apparent in the turnover of USCG personnel 
every 3-4 years (sometimes sooner). The structure can be rigid and at times 
confusing to those unfamiliar with the Coast Guard - perhaps a familiarization 
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training/class for new members? Some of the efforts of the AMSC can overlap with 
other non-Coast Guard, regional efforts. This can created conflicts and 
redundancies that need to be identified, considered and resolved. 
• Low collaboration: On a ten point scale, I would rate them all about a 4. 
• The Coast Guard's collaboration with my agency and with regional partners has 
been very good. I question the collaboration from other federal partners both 
working with the Coast Guard and other federal agencies, and collaborating with 
state/local agencies.    
• It is hard to push out goals and then follow up outcomes with so large of an AOR. 
Everyone who sits at the table is competing for limited resources. 
• Geography and the resulting limits on attendance, see above. 
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APPENDIX B. ROUND TWO SURVEY DATA 
A. SURVEY QUESTIONS  
1. “I would rate all AMSC's that we work with as marginal. AMSC's have 
become more political in nature and bureaucratic. They are comprised 
almost entirely of federal, state, and local agencies (police/fire) and have 
almost left out industry.”   Based on the response above, how important is 
private sector participation in the AMSCs?    
2. Based on the previous question, how can AMSCs improve private sector 
engagement?   
3. “The Coast Guard's collaboration with my agency and with regional 
partners has been very good. I question the collaboration from other 
federal partners both working with the Coast Guard and other federal 
agencies, and collaborating with state/local agencies.” Based on the 
response above, do you agree, and if so, why do you think this is?  
4. Based on the previous question, how can AMSCs get better collaboration 
with other federal partners? 
5. “Biggest challenge is geographic reach of the AOR and distance between 
ports. Most industry and largest ports are concentrated in the .... area, and 
meetings here are well attended by local industry and agencies. However, 
other ports... are between 2 and 4 hours away and cannot regularly attend 
meetings. Security concerns and cargo are also widely disparate between 
river and coastal ports, defeating most attempts at a "one size fits all" 
approach to addressing maritime issues.” Do you agree with the response 
above? If so, how can AMSCs incentivize participation for remote ports or 
overcome their barriers to participation?   
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6. “The AMSC's do not appear to regard the marine industry inputs…” Do 
you agree with the response above? If so why, and what can be done to 
increase collaboration with the private sector? 
7. If you could make any changes to AMSCs, what would they be? 
B. SURVEY ANSWERS  
Q1. I would rate all AMSC’s that we work with as marginal. AMSC’s have become 
more political in nature and bureaucratic. They are comprised almost entirely of 
federal, state, and local agencies (police/fire) and have almost left out industry.” 
Based on the response above, how important is private sector participation in the 
AMSCs?  
A1.1. Bigger Ports may see this as an issue, but with smaller ports, getting industry 
involved is not as challenging. With smaller scope, the presence of all 
stakeholders are usually present and have topics to share. Private sector is 
important in that port security grant funds are often obtained via a 
collaborative project with the private sector to enhance terminals and 
facilities. In the domain, we all play a part in security, not just LEO. 
A1.2. Private industry is instrumental. As a government agency, we need to realize 
that private industry has “right sized” therefore, the topics need to have a 
direct correlation to their facility/ segment of the maritime domain to justify 
attendance. 
A1.3. Private sector participation is very important. They control the vast majority 
of high risk and critical maritime infrastructure, and they are the primary 
target of programs like cyber security and port security grants. They are a 
natural participant and should be highly involved in the AMSC.  
A1.4. Just as important as the other sectors. Although the local, state and federal 
agencies are going to be the first responders it is our duty as the daily 
operators to prevent or mitigate potential risks. The industry can also 
provide intel not normally available to the other agencies 
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A1.5. Private sector participation is critical to the success of the AMSC; they are 
the end users. Because of our location, the Port does not participate in many 
meetings. "Political and Bureaucratic" is a broad statement. Without 
specific examples, it is hard to address this statement.  
A1.6. It's best to have a balance make-up Responders and industry 
A1.7. Varies, consultants can help do the heavy lifting on special projects/ and 
studies. Private sector companies that can impact maritime/port safety and 
security should be involved, For example if there are business that store 
hazardous materials/wastes in and around a port district, that if released 
would have an offsite consequence and impact the port or maritime 
environment thy should be involved. Also involvement by contractors that 
have cleanup response contracts along the maritime or port areas. 
A1.8. In order for the private sector to support our local law enforcement agencies, 
it is critical that we are involved 
A1.9. It is perceived to be marginal but in fact it is very important. 
A1.10. Private sector participation is extremely important in the AMSC; from 
major tenants to small and big business. The "area" is nothing without the 
participation of the organizations in the area. From a recovery standpoint, if 
the area organizations and businesses are not on board from the beginning, 
during the planning and exercise phase, response and recovery will be 
hamstrung. 
Q2. Based on the previous question, how can AMSCs improve private sector 
engagement?  
A2.1. In my experience, AMSCs have had good public/private sector turnout and 
involvement. 
A2.2. Topics need to have a direct correlation to their facility/ segment of the 
maritime domain to justify attendance. 
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A2.3. We need to incentivize private sector participation better. We have done 
outreach to industry and requested their participation on the AMSC, but 
their attendance/participation remains low. This is despite topics which 
should be of interest to them, such as Port Security Grant program and cyber 
resilience.  
A2.4. Provide an opportunity for the industry to act as a sounding board for new 
ideas and legislation. That would provide the framework for a system of 
continual revision and improvement. 
A2.5. Stakeholder meeting and surveys 
A2.6. Ensure their contributions are heard and taken serious. Can't pay them so 
need to make them feel their efforts manner. 
A2.7. Regular meetings, presentation on WWWWH their business impacts the 
maritime environment, commerce, safety and security. 
A2.8. AMSCs is doing a great job in inviting the private sector; I have nothing 
negative or suggestions at this time. 
A2.9. By providing value. Perhaps training, or regulation mitigation. If you are 
active with the AMSC your facility is inspected less.  
A2.10. Appoint some to AMSC and invite others to participate, especially 
representatives from tenant organizations. 
Q3. The Coast Guard's collaboration with my agency and with regional partners has 
been very good. I question the collaboration from other federal partners both 
working with the Coast Guard and other federal agencies, and collaborating with 
state/local agencies.” Based on the response above, do you agree, and if so, why do 
you think this is?  
A3.1. I don't have insight into this. I think the interaction with Captain of the Port 
and stakeholders that interct to improve maritime domain awareness is most 
important. 
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A3.2. Agree. The bottom line is each agency has it marching orders IRT mission 
and focus that do not line up with CG, for example cyber security and 
reporting. 
A3.3. As a USCG employee I can't speak for other federal agencies and their 
collaboration with state/local agencies. However, the AMSC is a good 
venue to make those connections and improve that engagement. 
A3.4. Neutral - personally I have tried to make connections with the local USCG 
agencies and have not been successful. The local agencies have been quick 
to respond and eager to participate. I unfortunately believe that the overall 
reactionary nature of Homeland Security causes this disconnect. 
A3.5. No response 
A3.6. Differing priorities I guess 
A3.7. In San Diego we have good opportunities for collaboration we lack 
dedicated funding at the local level for sustained involvement. 
A3.8. USCG is an amazing partner and is constantly communicating with the 
private sector 
A3.9. Federal agencies have agendas that don’t support local issues. 
A3.10. I agree in part. It all depends on the relationships within the AMSC and how 
hard the leadership of the AMSC is reaching out to federal partners. A 
strong AMSC can survive a weak COTP. 
Q4. Based on the previous question, how can AMSCs get better collaboration with other 
federal partners? 
A4.1. It stems with the site host and the familiarity with the domain. Perhaps 
mixing up hosts and locations. Getting smaller ports or other stakeholders 
more involved with agencies other than USCG will occur then.  
A4.2. Need another “9/11” or another event that will refocus attention with 
presidential guidance to get all agencies on the same page 
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A4.3. I feel the USCG has good collaboration with other federal agencies as well 
as state/local partners, and this is reflected in our strong AMSC engagement 
from these agencies.  
A4.4. Essentially the same response as to private sector engagement. 
A4.5. No response 
A4.6. Support from the top. Agency leaders need to stress their support. CG 
should be required to support other fed agency's efforts as well. 
A4.7. No Comment 
A4.8. (No Answer provided.) 
A4.9. Once again by insuring value  
A4.10. Regular exercises and information sessions outside the regularly scheduled 
meetings. It requires a significant amount of reaching out to those federal 
organizations to 'sell' the value of the AMSC and the PARTNERS within it. 
Q5. “Biggest challenge is geographic reach of the AOR and distance between ports. 
Most industry and largest ports are concentrated in the .... area, and meetings here 
are well attended by local industry and agencies. However, other ports... are 
between 2 and 4 hours away and cannot regularly attend meetings. Security 
concerns and cargo are also widely disparate between river and coastal ports, 
defeating most attempts at a "one size fits all" approach to addressing maritime 
issues.” Do you agree with the response above? If so, how can AMSCs incentivize 
participation for remote ports or overcome their barriers to participation?   
A5.1. I tend to agree with this. There are certainly issues with AOR and distance 
between host ports. I also tend to believe that certain ports in a COTP sector are 
more in reach and in common with the COTP and therefore garner the required 
attention that outlying ports need and want. This comes into play when PSGP funds 
are on the line. 
A5.2. yes, rotate meeting locations. 
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A5.3. This was my quote and if I had a good answer I'd have done it. I'd love to 
hear what others say to this. 
A5.4. No, this day and age of modern technology bridges the distance gap. Offer 
distance participation through video conferencing and webinars. 
A5.5. I agree, but most of the larger Ports are concentrated around the Colombia 
river. Consider regional visits to Ports like Coos Bay. I understand there 
will not be the same participation, but it will show that there involvement 
and participation is valued. 
A5.6. We don't have that as a problem 
A5.7. Have regional meetings to address the needs of that region. 
A5.8. I am in San Diego and we do not have that problem. We are widely 
connected to many federal and private sectors. 
A5.9. I agree. Better utilization of the harbor Safety Committee is a good answer. 
Make sure that grant dollars get to the outlying ports. They will be the 
staging areas for the bad guys.  
A5.10. There has NEVER been a "one size fits all" approach to Port management. 
Too many variables. And, this is not the 19th century; distance should not 
detract from establishing communication and arranging regular meetings. 
Q6. “The AMSC's do not appear to regard the marine industry inputs…” Do you agree 
with the response above? If so why, and what can be done to increase collaboration 
with the private sector? 
A6.1. No. 
A6.2. Yes and no...depends on the topic, I.E TWIC cards (industry input is one 
thing, regulations is different). 
A6.3. No I don't agree; I'm curious what the context was or any details from the 
above response (industry inputs to what?). See above for improving 
collaboration with industry. 
86 
A6.4. No, but I do think there is great room for improvement in the marine sector. 
Personal bias aside there is a lot of risk involved and we have been very 
fortunate to avoid an incident so far. 
A6.5. I have not experienced this. 
A6.6. No I don't agree 
A6.7. No Comment 
A6.8. (No answer provided.) 
A6.9. No.  
A6.10. Tough one. Some marine industry input is narrow minded and self-serving. 
Commercial fishermen, for example, seem to care little about the port, 
preparation and partnerships, only on profits and getting as much for as little 
as they can. So, their input tends to only deal with what is in their best 
interest and has little value for the region. 
Q7. If you could make any changes to AMSCs, what would they be? 
A7.1. Perhaps mixing up hosts and locations. 
A7.2. Good question. Legacy program are hard to get active participation. 
A7.3. No great ideas for changing AMSCs, but it would be helpful to have better 
guidance and resources re: USCG responsibilities for maritime cyber 
security/resilience. This is the area we get the most questions and have the 
fewest good answers. I suspect the recent national cyber strategy 
promulgation will only increase these questions. 
A7.4. Encourage participation and feedback from marine industry operators and 
include them on changes in AOR policies and interagency training 
opportunities. 
A7.5. No response 
A7.6. Sectors should provide an appropriate budget to manage the AMSC. 
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A7.7. No comment 
A7.8. Partnership certifications and or more frequent in person meetings 
A7.9. Closer. More productive 
A7.10. Educate the Coast Guard on the value and the need to reach out. Some 
AMSCs seem to put the onus of effort on other partners, participating, but 
not actually doing anything beyond that. Some of the above questions about 
the value of the AMSC relate directly to USCG units which pay lip service 
only, without providing assets, personnel etc.  
C. SURVEY ANSWERS CODED BY THEME  
Effective  
• Private industry is instrumental. As a government agency, we need to realize that 
private industry has “right sized” therefore, the topics need to have a direct 
correlation to their facility/ segment of the maritime domain to justify attendance. 
• Some marine industry input is narrow minded and self-serving. Commercial 
fishermen, for example, seem to care little about the port, preparation and 
partnerships, only on profits and getting as much for as little as they can. So, their 
input tends to only deal with what is in their best interest and has little value for 
the region. 
Communication  
• Ensure their contributions are heard and taken serious. Can't pay them so need to 
make them feel their efforts manner. 
• USCG is an amazing partner and is constantly communicating with the private 
sector 
Collaborate  
• In order for the private sector to support our local law enforcement agencies, it is 
critical that we are involved 
• Federal agencies have agendas that don’t support local issues. 
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• By providing value. Perhaps training, or regulation mitigation. If you are active 
with the AMSC your facility is inspected less. 
Information  
• Topics need to have a direct correlation to their facility/ segment of the maritime 
domain to justify attendance. 
• Regular meetings, presentation on WWWWH their business impacts the maritime 
environment, commerce, safety and security. 
• I feel the USCG has good collaboration with other federal agencies as well as 
state/local partners, and this is reflected in our strong AMSC engagement from 
these agencies. 
• No great ideas for changing AMSCs, but it would be helpful to have better 
guidance and resources re: USCG responsibilities for maritime cyber 
security/resilience. This is the area we get the most questions and have the fewest 
good answers. I suspect the recent national cyber strategy promulgation will only 
increase these questions. 
Participate  
• With smaller scope, the presence of all stakeholders are usually present and have 
topics to share. Private sector is important in that port security grant funds are 
often obtained via a collaborative project with the private sector to enhance 
terminals and facilities. In the domain, we all play a part in security, not just LEO. 
• Private industry is instrumental. As a government agency, we need to realize that 
private industry has “right sized” therefore, the topics need to have a direct 
correlation to their facility/ segment of the maritime domain to justify attendance. 
• Private sector participation is very important. They control the vast majority of 
high risk and critical maritime infrastructure, and they are the primary target of 
programs like cyber security and port security grants. They are a natural 
participant and should be highly involved in the AMSC.  
• Private sector participation is critical to the success of the AMSC; they are the end 
users. Because of our location, the Port does not participate in many meetings. 
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"Political and Bureaucratic" is a broad statement. Without specific examples, it is 
hard to address this statement.  
• Private sector participation is extremely important in the AMSC; from major 
tenants to small and big business. The "area" is nothing without the participation 
of the organizations in the area. From a recovery standpoint, if the area 
organizations and businesses are not on board from the beginning, during the 
planning and exercise phase, response and recovery will be hamstrung. 
• Encourage participation and feedback from marine industry operators and include 
them on changes in AOR policies and interagency training opportunities. 
Relationship  
• We need to incentivize private sector participation better. We have done outreach 
to industry and requested their participation on the AMSC, but their 
attendance/participation remains low. This is despite topics which should be of 
interest to them, such as Port Security Grant program and cyber resilience. 
• AMSCs is doing a great job in inviting the private sector; I have nothing negative 
or suggestions at this time. 
• The bottom line is each agency has it marching orders IRT mission and focus that 
do not line up with CG, for example cyber security and reporting. 
• As a USCG employee I can't speak for other federal agencies and their 
collaboration with state/local agencies. However, the AMSC is a good venue to 
make those connections and improve that engagement. 
• Neutral - personally I have tried to make connections with the local USCG 
agencies and have not been successful. The local agencies have been quick to 
respond and eager to participate. I unfortunately believe that the overall 
reactionary nature of Homeland Security causes this disconnect. 
• USCG is an amazing partner and is constantly communicating with the private 
sector 
• Educate the Coast Guard on the value and the need to reach out. Some AMSCs 
seem to put the onus of effort on other partners, participating, but not actually 
doing anything beyond that. Some of the above questions about the value of the 
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AMSC relate directly to USCG units which pay lip service only, without 
providing assets, personnel etc. 
Geography  
• There are certainly issues with AOR and distance between host ports. I also tend 
to believe that certain ports in a COTP sector are more in reach and in common 
with the COTP and therefore garner the required attention that outlying ports need 
and want. This comes into play when PSGP funds are on the line. 
• No, this day and age of modern technology bridges the distance gap. Offer 
distance participation through video conferencing and webinars. 
• Have regional meetings to address the needs of that region. 
• I agree. Better utilization of the harbor Safety Committee is a good answer. Make 
sure that grant dollars get to the outlying ports. They will be the staging areas for 
the bad guys. 
• There has NEVER been a "one size fits all" approach to Port management. Too 
many variables. And, this is not the 19th century; distance should not detract from 
establishing communication and arranging regular meetings. 
• Closer. More productive 
Incentive  
• Appoint some to AMSC and invite others to participate, especially representatives 
from tenant organizations. 
• In San Diego we have good opportunities for collaboration we lack dedicated 
funding at the local level for sustained involvement. 
• It stems with the site host and the familiarity with the domain. Perhaps mixing up 
hosts and locations. Getting smaller ports or other stakeholders more involved 
with agencies other than USCG will occur then. 
• Need another “9/11” or another event that will refocus attention with presidential 
guidance to get all agencies on the same page 
• Support from the top. Agency leaders need to stress their support. CG should be 
required to support other fed agency's efforts as well. 
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• Once again by insuring value 
• Regular exercises and information sessions outside the regularly scheduled 
meetings. It requires a significant amount of reaching out to those federal 
organizations to 'sell' the value of the AMSC and the PARTNERS within it. 
• I agree. Better utilization of the harbor Safety Committee is a good answer. Make 
sure that grant dollars get to the outlying ports. They will be the staging areas for 
the bad guys. 
• Perhaps mixing up hosts and locations. 
• Encourage participation and feedback from marine industry operators and include 
them on changes in AOR policies and interagency training opportunities. 
• Sectors should provide an appropriate budget to manage the AMSC. 
• Partnership certifications and or more frequent in person meetings 
• Private industry is instrumental. As a government agency, we need to realize that 
private industry has “right sized” therefore, the topics need to have a direct 
correlation to their facility/ segment of the maritime domain to justify attendance. 
D. SURVEY ANSWERS CODED BY SWOT  
1. Strengths 
These are considered the “positive attributes, tangible and intangible internal to 
your organization.”213 Examples of strengths are internal resources, assets, advantages such 
as staff or technical skill, etc. 
• USCG is an amazing partner and is constantly communicating with the private 
sector 
• With smaller scope, the presence of all stakeholders are usually present and have 
topics to share. Private sector is important in that port security grant funds are 
often obtained via a collaborative project with the private sector to enhance 
terminals and facilities. In the domain, we all play a part in security, not just LEO. 
                                                 
213 Berry.  
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• Private sector participation is very important. They control the vast majority of 
high risk and critical maritime infrastructure, and they are the primary target of 
programs like cyber security and port security grants. They are a natural 
participant and should be highly involved in the AMSC. 
• Private sector participation is critical to the success of the AMSC; they are the end 
users. Because of our location, the Port does not participate in many meetings. 
“Political and Bureaucratic” is a broad statement. Without specific examples, it is 
hard to address this statement.  
• AMSCs is doing a great job in inviting the private sector; I have nothing negative 
or suggestions at this time. 
• As a USCG employee I can't speak for other federal agencies and their 
collaboration with state/local agencies. However, the AMSC is a good venue to 
make those connections and improve that engagement. 
2. Weaknesses  
These are things that reduce the effectiveness or value of an organization; these are 
usually internal factors.214 In this case, finances, geography, and leadership are all 
examples.  
• Some marine industry input is narrow minded and self-serving. Commercial 
fishermen, for example, seem to care little about the port, preparation and 
partnerships, only on profits and getting as much for as little as they can. So, their 
input tends to only deal with what is in their best interest and has little value for 
the region. 
• Ensure their contributions are heard and taken serious. Can't pay them so need to 
make them feel their efforts manner. 
• Federal agencies have agendas that don’t support local issues. 
• No great ideas for changing AMSCs, but it would be helpful to have better 
guidance and resources re: USCG responsibilities for maritime cyber 
                                                 
214 Berry. 
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security/resilience. This is the area we get the most questions and have the fewest 
good answers. I suspect the recent national cyber strategy promulgation will only 
increase these questions. 
• We need to incentivize private sector participation better. We have done outreach 
to industry and requested their participation on the AMSC, but their 
attendance/participation remains low. This is despite topics which should be of 
interest to them, such as Port Security Grant program and cyber resilience. 
• Neutral - personally I have tried to make connections with the local USCG 
agencies and have not been successful. The local agencies have been quick to 
respond and eager to participate. I unfortunately believe that the overall 
reactionary nature of Homeland Security causes this disconnect. 
3. Opportunities  
In the business environment, opportunities are viewed largely as external options 
that are “reasons your business is likely to prosper” or things an organization can capitalize 
on for profit.215 In the case of AMSCs, there were several factors that were internal 
opportunities, i.e., people or internal resources that could be capitalized on for the 
betterment of the group.  
• Private industry is instrumental. As a government agency, we need to realize that 
private industry has “right sized” therefore, the topics need to have a direct 
correlation to their facility/ segment of the maritime domain to justify attendance. 
• By providing value. Perhaps training, or regulation mitigation. If you are active 
with the AMSC your facility is inspected less. 
• Topics need to have a direct correlation to their facility/ segment of the maritime 
domain to justify attendance. 
• Regular meetings, presentation on WWWWH their business impacts the maritime 
environment, commerce, safety and security. 
                                                 
215 Berry. 
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• Encourage participation and feedback from marine industry operators and include 
them on changes in AOR policies and interagency training opportunities. 
• We need to incentivize private sector participation better. We have done outreach 
to industry and requested their participation on the AMSC, but their 
attendance/participation remains low. This is despite topics which should be of 
interest to them, such as Port Security Grant program and cyber resilience. 
• Educate the Coast Guard on the value and the need to reach out. Some AMSCs 
seem to put the onus of effort on other partners, participating, but not actually 
doing anything beyond that. Some of the above questions about the value of the 
AMSC relate directly to USCG units which pay lip service only, without 
providing assets, personnel etc. 
• There are certainly issues with AOR and distance between host ports. I also tend 
to believe that certain ports in a COTP sector are more in reach and in common 
with the COTP and therefore garner the required attention that outlying ports need 
and want. This comes into play when PSGP funds are on the line. 
• Have regional meetings to address the needs of that region. 
• Appoint some to AMSC and invite others to participate, especially representatives 
from tenant organizations. 
• It stems with the site host and the familiarity with the domain. Perhaps mixing up 
hosts and locations. Getting smaller ports or other stakeholders more involved 
with agencies other than USCG will occur then. 
• Support from the top. Agency leaders need to stress their support. CG should be 
required to support other fed agency's efforts as well. 
• Regular exercises and information sessions outside the regularly scheduled 
meetings. It requires a significant amount of reaching out to those federal 
organizations to 'sell' the value of the AMSC and the PARTNERS within it. 
• Perhaps mixing up hosts and locations. 
• Encourage participation and feedback from marine industry operators and include 
them on changes in AOR policies and interagency training opportunities. 
• Sectors should provide an appropriate budget to manage the AMSC. 
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• Private industry is instrumental. As a government agency, we need to realize that 
private industry has “right sized” therefore, the topics need to have a direct 
correlation to their facility/ segment of the maritime domain to justify attendance. 
4. Threats 
These are generally considered external factors beyond the organization’s control. 
However, one can take preventive measures to minimize the exposure to threats. Threats 
have been interpreted as anything that can lead up to a transportation security incident or 
externally influence the behavior or effectiveness of AMSCs.  
• There are certainly issues with AOR and distance between host ports. I also tend 
to believe that certain ports in a COTP sector are more in reach and in common 
with the COTP and therefore garner the required attention that outlying ports need 
and want. This comes into play when PSGP funds are on the line. 
• In San Diego we have good opportunities for collaboration we lack dedicated 
funding at the local level for sustained involvement. 
• Need another “9/11” or another event that will refocus attention with presidential 
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